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Articles 
 
Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information 
Problem 
IGNACIO N. COFONE† 
While algorithmic decision-making has proven to be a challenge for traditional 
antidiscrimination law, there is an opportunity to regulate algorithms through the information 
that they are fed. But blocking information about protected categories will rarely protect these 
groups effectively because other information will act as proxies. To avoid disparate treatment, 
the protected category attributes cannot be considered; but to avoid disparate impact, they must 
be considered. This leads to a paradox in regulating information to prevent algorithmic 
discrimination. This Article addresses this problem. It suggests that, instead of ineffectively 
blocking or passively allowing attributes in training data, we should modify them. We should use 
existing pre-processing techniques to alter the data that is fed to algorithms to prevent disparate 
impact outcomes. This presents a number of doctrinal and policy benefits and can be implemented 
also where other legal approaches cannot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Algorithmic decisions affect everyone, often without their knowledge. 
Increasingly, algorithms make impactful decisions for people’s daily lives, from 
determining whether someone will receive a loan,1 to determining the type of 
healthcare a person will receive,2 to predicting whether someone should be 
granted parole.3 While, thirty years ago, decisions that shaped people’s lives 
were made by other people, key decisions in finance, criminal law, employment, 
health, politics, and online speech, to name just a few, are increasingly made by 
machines.4 For example, for the question “will this candidate be a good 
borrower?” an algorithm compares his or her characteristics with the 
characteristics of those who have paid their debts. For “will this person 
recidivate if given parole?” it compares his or her characteristics with those that 
recidivated during parole. 
Algorithmic decision-making offers multiple benefits to society.5 For 
many tasks, algorithms surpass human abilities, and the set of those tasks is 
constantly expanding.6 Given their potential, the ideal is thus not to ban 
algorithms, but to regulate them appropriately.7 To help us learn how to do so, 
this Article focuses on one of the central promises that comes with a change 
from human to algorithmic decision-makers: a decrease in the prevalence of bias 
and discrimination.8 The promise that is often attached to these systems is that, 
 
 1. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND 
INFORMATION 4–6 (2015). 
 2. HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMS 109–12 (2018). 
 3. Id. at 54–56. 
 4. AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 1–5 (2018); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 9–10 (2018). 
 5. Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 443, 450–51 
(2016). 
 6. Vasant Dhar, Should We Regulate Digital Platforms?, 5 BIG DATA 277 (2017); Vasant Dhar, When to 
Trust Robots with Decisions, and When Not to, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/when-
to-trust-robots-with-decisions-and-when-not-to. There seems to be a limitation to this principle: those processes 
that are automated within ourselves. If you ask a computer and a human to make a simple algebra calculation 
such as the square root of eighty-seven, the computer will obviously be able to do this faster. But if you grab 
and throw a ball and ask a human and a robot designed for this purpose to catch it, you will find that no robot 
exists so far that can do this as well as an average person. The distinction between one process and the other is 
normally referred to as a distinction between System 1 and System 2. See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, 
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate, 23 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 645, 658 
(2000); Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255 (2008); see also IN TWO MINDS: DUAL PROCESSES AND BEYOND, (Jonathan St. B. T. 
Evans & Keith Frankish eds., 2009). 
 7. See Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
87, 87–89 (2017) (arguing that we need a realistic picture of what humans and machines can accomplish, which 
includes being aware of machines’ defects but also seeing where machines can improve human decision-
making). Cf. Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 92–104 (2017) (describing the 
advantages, disadvantages, and likely future implications using algorithms). 
 8. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND 
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 1–13 (2016). 
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while bias and prejudices plague us humans, algorithms are impartial, fair, and 
unbiased decision-makers.9  
This promise has gone unfulfilled. Researchers continue to find that 
algorithms disproportionately disadvantage members of vulnerable minorities.10 
This makes it crucial to determine when algorithmic decisions are 
discriminatory and, especially given concerns about the effectiveness of 
traditional remedies that flow from discrimination, explore how to prevent their 
discriminatory outcomes. Given the increasing prevalence of algorithms in 
socially significant decisions, making progress on this front stands to change the 
daily lives of thousands of citizens.  
Traditional antidiscrimination law deals with the regulation of (human) 
behavior around the use of information about others as the basis for 
discriminatory practices.11 There is, however, benefit from additionally 
regulating the acquisition of such information.12 Information rules, or privacy 
rules, that prevent a decision-maker from knowing the potentially discriminatory 
information, can prevent them from discriminating in the first place.13 
This Article explores the relevance of this idea for artificial intelligence 
(A.I.) discrimination.14 There is a growing body of literature that examines the 
social problems generated by algorithmic bias, the ethical dilemmas introduced 
by A.I., and whether the use of A.I. should be limited against disadvantaged 
groups,15 but the role that the law can take in shaping how these systems are 
formed to reduce such harm remains under-explored. While a rich body of legal 
literature to date has focused on the potential harms that the increased reliance 
on A.I. poses, little has been said about how the law can prevent these harms.16 
 
 9. But see infra Subpart I.B. 
 10. See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 4 at 9; SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW 
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 1–3 (2018); see also Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: 
A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 64–67 (2017) (making a similar 
argument for big data). 
 11. Ignacio N. Cofone, Antidiscriminatory Privacy, 72 SMU L. REV. 139, 140–141 (2019). 
 12. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 483–84 (2010) [hereinafter Preempting Discrimination]; Jessica 
L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2147–56 (2014) 
[hereinafter Protecting Privacy]. See Anupam Datta et al., Correspondences Between Privacy and 
Nondiscrimination: Why They Should be Studied Together (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.01735.pdf 
(showing that key aspects of privacy and nondiscrimination mirror each other at a formal level). 
 13. See generally Cofone, supra note 11. 
 14. Here, I refer to machine learning discrimination and A.I. discrimination indistinctly. See Ignacio N. 
Cofone, Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 167, 179 (2018) (arguing 
that, for the problem of non-contractual harms, the law should treat robots, A.I. agents, and algorithms 
indistinctly).  
 15. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on Hispanics, 56 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 
(2017); Madden et al., supra note 10. 
 16. Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 
93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 587 (2018). Amanda Levendowski has addressed this effort in the cited article, exploring 
how copyright law can be used for these purposes. See id. at 619–30 (arguing that copyright law is the most 
powerful branch of law impacting AI bias and offering solutions through the doctrine of fair use); see also 
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In particular, as David Lehr and Paul Ohm write, “almost all of the significant 
legal scholarship to date has focused on the implications of the running 
model . . . and has neglected most of the possibilities and pitfalls of playing with 
the data.”17 This proliferation of scholarship has led the A.I. Now Institute to 
state that “[t]he question is no longer whether there are harms and biases in A.I. 
systems. That debate has been settled: the evidence has mounted beyond 
doubt . . . . [t]he next task now is addressing these harms.”18 In a similar vein, a 
White House report from 2016 called for “manag[ing A.I.’s] risks and 
challenges . . . [in] ensur[ing] that everyone has the opportunity . . . to 
participate in its benefits,”19 and called for “equal opportunity by design.”20  
Recent literature has shown that algorithmic discrimination works 
differently from purely human discrimination.21 However, while it is true that 
human and algorithmic discrimination differ in many ways, they have a similar 
underlying information dynamic. The crucial task in preventing discrimination 
through information rules in both cases is identifying not only information about 
the protected category, but also information that acts as proxies for the protected 
category.22 Antidiscriminatory information rules must focus on the information 
that can be used as proxies to shift discrimination to other groups,23 both for 
human and machine discrimination. 
For both forms of discrimination, information rules can offer short-term 
protection from discrimination by altering the data that the law deems harmful 
to use in a decision-making process. In this way, information rules can aid 
antidiscriminatory efforts. However, this altering of the data works differently 
for algorithms than it does for humans.24 For algorithms, the solution is neither 
more data nor less data. It is more meaningful data. And more meaningful data 
means, counterintuitively, a data sample that is unrepresentative of the pool, 
because it looks like what we believe the pool would look like had it not 
embedded structural inequalities. 
Because of the difficulties that it poses to antidiscrimination law, 
antidiscriminatory information rules are particularly useful to address 
 
Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1007–14 (2017). 
See generally Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017). 
 17. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine 
Learning, 51 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 655 (2017). 
 18. MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW REPORT 2018 42 (2018). 
 19. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 2016). 
 20. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (May 2016). 
 21. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673–76 
(2016); Pauline T. Kim, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence: New Challenges for Workplace Equality, 57 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 321 (2019) [hereinafter Big Data and Artificial Intelligence]; Pauline T. Kim, Data-
Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860-61 (2017) [hereinafter Data-Driven 
Discrimination]. 
 22. Cofone, supra note 11, at 151–58. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See infra Part III.  
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algorithmic discrimination. The algorithmic discrimination literature identifying 
these harms and challenges has so far brought useful legal approaches to an 
information problem (the problem of an information point being misused). This 
Article takes a different but complementary approach, and proposes that we must 
also establish an information solution to the informational problem that is 
algorithmic discrimination. 
Part I explains the difference between knowledge-based, machine learning 
and deep learning algorithms, as well as the different ways in which these 
algorithms can lead to discriminatory outcomes: bias in the process, bias in the 
sample data, and social bias reflected in the data. Part II introduces the idea of 
an information approach to reduce discrimination. It explains how the law 
deploys such approach for human decision-makers and the specific challenges 
in applying this approach to algorithms. Part III develops how the information 
approach can be used with algorithmic decision-making. It separates between 
reducing, expanding, and transfer proxies, and it argues that we can and should 
deploy pre-processing techniques to either encode or shape training data. Part 
IV analyzes the doctrinal consequences of such a proposal: it overcomes the 
algorithmic fairness impossibility and the tension between disparate impact and 
disparate treatment in antidiscrimination law, it avoids the problem of 
algorithmic opacity to apply antidiscrimination measures, and it reaps the benefit 
of ex-ante regulation as a complement to ex-post liability. 
I. ALGORITHMS CAN DISCRIMINATE 
It is as dangerous as it is inaccurate to believe that, because algorithmic 
decision-making is computational, it cannot discriminate. Algorithms can be 
classified in knowledge-based and machine learning, which is the type this 
Article is centrally concerned with. These (machine learning) algorithms present 
the unfulfilled promise of unbiased decisions. The resulting discrimination can 
be classified along three categories. There can be bias among the people who 
create the algorithm that gets translated into the data-processing mechanism, 
there can be bias in the sample that is used by the algorithm, and there can be 
data that have inequality embedded in a way that leads to disparate impact. The 
first is a bias in the process, the second is a bias in the input (sample), and the 
third is a societal bias captured in representative data. 
A. KNOWLEDGE-BASED, MACHINE LEARNING, AND DEEP LEARNING 
Knowledge-based systems are traditional algorithms, which work when a 
computer scientist designs a list of decision rules for the algorithm to walk data 
points through, and can be visualized in the form of a flowchart. Machine 
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learning algorithms, on the other hand, extract those rules from their training 
data.25 
Machine learning is a way of training an algorithm. While it became 
popular in the mid-2000s, its first definitions appeared much earlier. In 1959, 
Arthur Samuel notably called it an algorithm’s “ability to learn without being 
explicitly programmed.”26 While knowledge-based algorithms are built on 
decision trees and detailed instructions indicating how to process data, machine 
learning algorithms are given large amounts of data with output variables for the 
algorithm to self-adjust. Instead of determining decision rules, human 
intervention is limited to selecting features for the training data and attaching 
labels to the output data.27 There are many ways to do this, such as decision tree 
learning, reinforcement learning, clustering, and Bayesian networks.28 
Regardless of the mode in which the algorithm learns, the characteristic that is 
central to our purposes is that the model can learn decision rules.  
Deep learning is a type of machine learning that became popular in 2012.29 
Deep learning uses a layered structure called an artificial neural network, which 
simulates a biological brain’s neural network.30 Like other forms of machine 
learning, deep learning algorithms collect training data, learn from it, and then 
apply what they learned to larger datasets to determine or predict something 
about reality. The difference is that, whereas machine learning requires feature 
selection, deep learning has automatic feature extraction. The algorithm engages 
in its own feature selection, adding layers of features that are used to map real-
world data to a specific outcome.31 That is, they adjust the weight given to each 
neuron and type of information.32 This means that deep learning does not require 
a data scientist to intervene where its predictions are unsatisfactory—the neural 
network will make decisions about how its approach should change.33 For 
example, self-driving cars use deep learning algorithms to recognize obstacles. 
The more that you “drive” your self-driving car, the better it will get at 
recognizing obstacles. While deep learning is not currently used in decision-
making applications as are other machine learning models, it is by no means a 
 
 25. Karen Hao, What is Machine Learning? We Drew You Another Flowchart, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612437/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-another-flowchar 
t/.  
 26. MARIETTE AWAD, RAHUL KHANNA, EFFICIENT LEARNING MACHINES: THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND 
APPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERS AND SYSTEM DESIGNERS 1 (2015); A. L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine 
Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 IBM J. RES. DEV. 210 (1959). 
 27. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2225 (2019). 
 28. FRY, supra note 2, at 56–59. 
 29. Dave Gershgorn, The Data that Transformed AI Research—and Possibly the World, QUARTZ (July 26, 
2017), https://qz.com/1034972/the-data-that-changed-the-direction-of-ai-research-and-possibly-the-world/. 
 30. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 17, at 670. 
 31. IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING 8 (2016). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (“Deep learning is a particular kind of machine learning that achieves great power and flexibility by 
representing the world as a nested hierarchy of concepts, with each concept defined in relation to simpler 
concepts, and more abstract representations computed in terms of less abstract ones.”). 
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stretch of the imagination to see it increasingly applied to decision-making in 
the near future.  
B. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF UNBIASED DECISION-MAKERS 
Algorithmic decision-making is sometimes taken to imply that the 
prevalence of biases for discrimination decreases. While we humans are flawed 
and, even when well-meaning, host a wide array of implicit biases, algorithms 
are often presented as fairer and unbiased decision-making agents.34 
However, in the last few years, piles of documented cases have appeared 
regarding decision-making processes in which algorithms also produce a 
discriminatory outcome—even assuming no discriminatory intent.35 Examples 
of this exist in almost any area of decision-making, but perhaps the most 
prevalent are criminal procedure and employment. 
The first example, as well-known as it is illustrative, pertains to criminal 
procedure. A few years ago, Northpointe (now called Equivant) developed a risk 
assessment algorithm called COMPAS to use as a recidivism indicator: the 
algorithm was designed to predict the likelihood of a person to re-offend within 
two years.36 COMPAS is widely used to predict the likelihood that people who 
have been arrested will commit future crimes, and to determine parole. In a now 
classic article, ProPublica accused COMPAS of producing racially biased 
results, having almost twice as many false positives for black defendants than 
for white defendants and more frequent false negatives for white defendants than 
for black defendants.37 In other words, the algorithm mistakenly identified as 
high risk twice as many black individuals than it did white individuals, and 
 
 34. There are many academic references that illustrate this position but perhaps the most interesting 
illustration is one of popular culture. In the movie, MONEYBALL (Columbia Pictures 2011), Billy Beane (Brad 
Pitt) was hired to help choose baseball players for a team. At the beginning of the movie, there is a scene in 
which he observes the previous coaches choose the next player based on factors such as whether they look 
confident, are good looking, or have a girlfriend. Beane condescendingly suggests, instead, to have an 
“automated” process based on the performance statistics of each player. This is presented in the movie, and 
outside of it, as a fair and impartial process—and more often than not, it is one. 
 35. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21; Toon Calders & Indrė Žliobaitė, Why Unbiased Computational 
Processes Can Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 43, 55–56 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 
2013); Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and Discrimination, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018); Danielle 
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 8–18 (2014); Tal Z. Zarsky, An Analytic Challenge: Discrimination Theory in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 
14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 11, 15–22 (2017). 
 36. Tim Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment 
System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21, 22–24 (2009). 
 37. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future 
Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (finding the false positives to be 23.5% for white 
defendants and 44.9% for black defendants, and finding the false negatives to be 47.7% for white defendants, 
and 28.0% for black defendants); Jeff Larsen et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-
algorithm. 
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mistakenly identified as low risk more white individuals than it did black 
individuals.38 Since then, dozens of papers have been written criticizing 
COMPAS. 39 
COMPAS is not the only algorithm to have a disparate impact when 
making risk assessment predictions. A different risk assessment algorithm, used 
at the federal level to make probation decisions, was also found to give a higher 
average score of post-conviction risk assessment to black individuals.40 Even if 
the study may conclude that bias is unlikely because 66% of the racial difference 
was attributable to criminal history, and criminal history is not a proxy for race, 
criminal history does affect the relationship between race and future arrest; this 
is because, for the same criminal activity, black individuals are more likely to 
be arrested than white individuals.41 
An illustrative employment example is a machine learning system that 
Amazon recently developed to rank job candidates. The system displayed a 
significant bias against female candidates, justifiably triggering public outcry.42 
 
 38. In addition, COMPAS was accused of being as accurate as a simple predictor based on prior count both 
on false positives and on false negatives—even when COMPAS and the prior count predictor may disagree. 
While the inaccuracy problem and the discrimination problem are distinct, the accusations of inaccuracy should 
raise eyebrows. See Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in 
Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 153, 156 (2017). 
 39. Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017); Fiona Doherty, Obey All 
Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291 (2016); Jessica M. Eaglin, 
Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017); Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: 
Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (2015); Hamilton, supra note 15; Kelly 
Hannah-Moffat, Algorithmic Risk Governance: Big Data Analytics, Race and Information Activism in Criminal 
Justice Debates, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY, 2018; Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal 
Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019); Richard F. Lowden, Risk Assessment Algorithms: The Answer to an 
Inequitable Bail System?, 19 N. C. J. L. & TECH. 221 (2018); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the 
Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Danielle Kehl et al., Algorithms in 
the Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITIES 
INITIATIVE, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (July 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/1/33746041/2017-07_responsivecommunities_2.pdf. 
 40. Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and 
Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 685 (2016). 
 41. Id. at 700. 
 42. James Cook, Amazon Scraps “Sexist AI” Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women, 
TELEGRAPH, (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/10/10/amazon-scraps-sexist-ai-
recruiting-tool-showed-bias-against/; Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias 
Against Women, REUTERS, (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-
insight-idUSKCN1MK08G; Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against 
Women, STAR ONLINE, (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2018/10/10/amazon-
scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women/; Roberto Iriondo, Amazon Scraps Secret AI 
Recruiting Engine that Showed Biases Against Women, MEDIUM, (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-engine-that-showed-biases-against-
women-995c505f5c6f; Cathy O’Neil, Amazon’s Gender-Biased Algorithm Is Not Alone, BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 16, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-16/amazon-s-gender-biased-algorithm-is-not-
alone; James Vincent, Amazon Reportedly Scraps Internal AI Recruiting Tool that Was Biased Against Women, 
VERGE, (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/10/17958784/ai-recruiting-tool-bias-amazon-
report; Jordan Weissmann, Amazon Created a Hiring Tool Using AI. It Immediately Started Discriminating 
Against Women., SLATE, (Oct. 10, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/10/amazon-artificial-intelligence-
hiring-discrimination-women.html. 
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Because the algorithm was trained using Amazon’s existing hiring data under 
the idea that Amazon’s current employee choices are a good proxy for Amazon’s 
desired employee choices, the algorithm reflected existing hiring practices. 
These practices, however, to the surprise of the algorithm’s programmers, ended 
up being sexist.43  
The Amazon algorithm illustrates a key concern of algorithmic 
discrimination: not only does automated decision-making mirror existing biases, 
but it has the potential to amplify them.44 The types of societal biases held among 
human decision-makers are, to a large extent, consistent. Yet, human decision-
makers exercise decisions on a case-by-case basis, implicating different levels 
of bias. Automated decision-making, on the other hand, brings perfect 
consistency across decisions. With this consistency, it brings the potential to 
discriminate systemically.45 In such a way, existing patterns of discrimination 
embedded in machine learning models leads them to not only perpetuate, but 
directly contribute to, further marginalization.46  
Many examples of algorithmic bias seem to indicate that algorithmic bias 
is most likely to affect disadvantaged populations: those who are more likely to 
find themselves asking for parole or who are more likely to apply for the type of 
jobs that use an algorithm to screen candidates.47 While it is true that 
disadvantaged populations are disproportionately affected, it is not true that they 
are the only ones affected. Several examples illustrate this, most commonly in 
allocating healthcare, particularly by determining health insurance quotas,48 and 
financial instruments, particularly through credit scores.49 The Amazon 
 
 43. The algorithm, for example, panelized resumes that contained explicitly gendered words such as 
“woman,” and candidates who went to colleges that were identified as all-women institutions. See id. 
 44. See supra Mayson, note 27, at 2251 (“[P]rediction functions like a mirror. The premise of prediction 
is that, absent intervention, history will repeat itself. So what prediction does is identify patterns in past data and 
offer them as projections about future events.”); Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra note 21, at 320 (“If 
the employer’s prior hiring practices excluded certain groups—for example, the hypothetical Tech Co., which 
hired very few women as computer programmers in the past—the algorithm will simply reproduce the previously 
existing biases. . . . [t]he selection tool might operate to exclude racial or ethnic minorities.”). 
 45. Indrė Žliobaitė, A Survey on Measuring Indirect Discrimination in Machine Learning 4 (Oct. 2015), 
(unpublished manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/1511.00148 (“While human decision makers may make biased 
decisions on case by case basis, rules produced by algorithms are applied consistently, and may discriminate 
more systematically and at a larger scale.”); Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra note 21, at 322 
(discussing the making of decisions on a large scale, affecting whole groups rather than individual cases). 
 46. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 677–93; Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21, at 883–92; 
Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra note 21, at 321–22 (“If an algorithm erroneously predicts that I am 
pregnant and sends me coupons for diapers, I can simply ignore them. If, however, it predicts—erroneously—
that I will not be a good employee and I am denied a job as a result, it has created a much more significant 
problem for me. And if an algorithm not only makes an erroneous prediction about an individual worker, but 
makes predictions across cases or populations in a way that is systematically wrong or biased—that raises much 
broader social concerns.”); NOBLE, supra note 10. 
 47. See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 4. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 11 
ACM QUEUE, Apr. 2, 2013, at 1 (showing that arrest records advertisements are more likely to appear on searches 
for black-sounding names). 
 48. PASQUALE, supra note 1. 
 49. FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE 
ISSUES 12 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues-ftc-
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algorithm example, moreover, illustrates that the use of A.I. is not restricted to 
low-income employment.50 The everyday life of every American citizen is 
affected by automated decision-making, whether they know it or not. 
The promise of fair and unbiased algorithmic deciders has not delivered. It 
has failed to deliver not because algorithms are not useful to make decisions and 
we must get rid of them. Rather, it has failed to deliver because algorithmic 
discrimination is a discrimination problem among humans that, because it 
introduces a different type of interaction, must be regulated differently.51 
C. BIASED PROCESS 
The most evident type of algorithmic bias is a bias in the way in which an 
algorithm processes information: a bias in the model itself, or a classification 
bias. A biased process is the type of bias that traces most clearly to traditional 
antidiscrimination law, as treating two groups differently maps onto disparate 
treatment.52  
We sometimes believe that we are interacting with an A.I. For example, 
when we have our credit score calculated for loans or credit card applications, 
our car speeds monitored for fines, or our risk determined for airport security 
checks. But instead, we are interacting, through the algorithm, with the humans 
that design and apply it.53 Algorithms are not a new type of agent, but a new way 
in which we interact with other people. This insight has crucial implications for 
understanding discrimination. As Nick Seaver puts it, “[w]hile some proponents 
of algorithms—or machine learning, or artificial intelligence, or whatever 
complexly responsive software is called by the time you read this—may claim 
that their systems are autonomous, there are [people] everywhere, tweaking and 
tuning, repairing and refactoring.”54  
Realizing this fact is highly consequential. It means that, when analyzing 
how interactions with algorithms are structured, we can build on our knowledge 
 
report; Tracy Alloway, Big Data: Credit Where Credit’s Due, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7933792e-a2e6-11e4-9c06-00144feab7de. 
 50. See Amit Datta et al., Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings, 1 PROC. PRIVACY ENHANCING 
TECH. 92, 95, 105 (2015) (showing that advertisements for high-income jobs are shown to men more than they 
are to women). 
 51. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 124–28 (2014) (arguing that the predictive nature of big data 
changes the assumptions of current legislation and a right to procedural data due process is needed); Pauline T. 
Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online Employment Recruiting, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 
2019) (questioning whether current law of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are able to 
cover all forms of targeted recruitment given their outdated archetype of recruitment models); Mark A. Lemley 
& Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots 104–07 (Stan. Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 523, 2019) (arguing 
that artificial intelligence and robots complicate the question of the appropriate remedy). 
 52. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 694–98; see also infra Subpart IV.A. 
 53. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: The Three 
Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1221 (2017); Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of 
Model Interpretability, ACM QUEUE, July 17, 2018, at 2–6.  
 54. Nick Seaver, What Should an Anthropology of Algorithms Do?, 33 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 375, 
378 (2018). 
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of interactions with other humans.55 When used to make decisions, algorithms, 
simply put, are tools for a person to use a large dataset to predict the desired 
output.56  
Algorithms are never entirely autonomous.57 Any decision-making 
algorithm requires a human to determine the desired output under a conditional 
probability (“given input X produce this output Y”).58 Under the examples 
mentioned above, supervised learning would consist of a person ordering “here 
is an email, output the probability of this email being spam” or “here is a 
potential tenant’s data, output the probability of this tenant defaulting on 
payment.” The same can be said under unsupervised learning, given that humans 
must choose the input data to develop (unlabeled) features and the output 
variable that serves as a proxy for the desired characteristic. 
While bias in machine learning algorithms is often a data bias, humans 
must frame the problem and make a choice about what the algorithm should 
predict before any data are processed.59 For an algorithm to be used, 
“recidivism” or “employability” must translate into something measurable.60 
Moreover, after determining the prediction’s goal, humans must also decide 
which attributes they want the algorithm to consider in order for the algorithm 
to determine whether and how much each of the attributes is predictive of the 
stated goal.61 
 
 55. See Cofone, supra note 14 (arguing that the legal problems posed by A.I. are problems among humans 
intermediated by A.I. and, based on that idea, proposing different analogies to address those problems). 
 56. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 4; see also Bryan Pfaffenberger, Fetishised Objects and Humanised 
Nature: Towards an Anthropology of Technology, 23 MAN 236, 241 (1988) (“Technology is not an independent, 
non-social variable that has an ‘impact’ on society or culture. On the contrary, any technology is a set of social 
behaviours and a system of meanings. To restate the point: when we examine the ‘impact’ of technology on 
society, we are talking about the impact of one kind of social behaviour on another.”); Seaver, supra note 54, at 
382 (“[A]nthropology’s greatest contribution to contemporary critical discourse about algorithms may be the 
corrosive potential of anthropological attention itself, which promises to break down the apparent solidity and 
coherence of the algorithm.”). 
 57. Seaver, supra note 54, at 378 (“[P]ress on any algorithmic decision and you will find many human 
ones: people like Brad or his manager deciding that a certain error threshold is acceptable, that one data source 
should be used over another or that a good recommendation means this, not that. These systems are, as a former 
head of recommendation at Spotify put it, ‘human all the way down’ (citation omitted). There is no such thing 
as an algorithmic decision; there are only ways of seeing decisions as algorithmic.”). 
 58. This claim is often made for machine learning more generally. See Lipton, supra note 53. See Seaver, 
supra note 54, at 378 (“While discourses about algorithms sometimes describe them as ‘unsupervised,’ working 
without a human in the loop, in practice there are no unsupervised algorithms. If you cannot see a human in the 
loop, you just need to look for a bigger loop.”). While there are some examples of unsupervised learning, such 
as clustering and dimensionality reduction, none of them pertain predictive algorithms used for decision-making. 
 59. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 677–84 (explaining that programmers may introduce bias into the 
algorithm when choosing training data or choosing a target variable); see also Balkin, supra note 53, at 1223 
(“But in most cases, the problem isn’t the robots; it’s the humans.”). 
 60. Samir Passi & Solon Barocas, Problem Formulation and Fairness, in PROC. OF THE CONF. ON 
FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 39–48 (2019), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3287560.3287567 
(explaining how bias is generated in the process of identifying goals). 
 61. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 35, at 14 (“Software engineers construct the datasets mined by scoring 
systems; they define the parameters of data-mining analyses; they create the clusters, links, and decision trees 
applied; they generate the predictive models applied. The biases and values of system developers and software 
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The biases of humans that program and apply the algorithm can translate 
into the algorithm, and sometimes stereotypes and negative associations can be 
codified in and amplified by the algorithm.62 Algorithms, after all, are built, 
trained, and implemented by people that, like everyone else, have prior beliefs 
and goals determined by social factors.63 
Researchers have known for a long time that people’s prior beliefs translate 
into the algorithms that they generate.64 Common behavioral biases that could 
turn into a model’s assumptions are, for example, reporting bias, selection bias, 
and availability bias. These could be translated, for example, into faulty labeling, 
faulty personalization that leads to filter bubbles or tunnel vision, incorrectly 
assuming causation, or one side of the matching incorrectly given an advantage 
over the other side. Facial recognition machine learning software, for example, 
have been shown to be affected by the demographics of the people who design 
them.65 This issue is exacerbated if programmers are disproportionately male, 
white, and heterosexual.66 
A key reported challenge to applying disparate treatment to a biased 
algorithmic process is developing a theory of intent.67 But the relevant intent 
 
programmers are embedded into each and every step of development.”); Seaver, supra note 54, at 378-79 (“Take, 
for instance, the case of the programmer Jacky Alciné (2015), who discovered that Google Photos had 
automatically tagged a picture of him and a friend as containing ‘gorillas.’ . . . By the next day, the objectionable 
tag was gone. If we grant algorithms autonomy, treating them as though they are external to human culture, then 
we cannot make any sense of this story—why it happened in the first place, how it was resolved, and why similar 
problems might happen again. Tales of autonomous algorithms cannot explain why the system works differently 
now than it did then. To explain what happened, we need to talk about the makeup of technical teams, the social 
processes by which those teams define and discover problems, how they identify acceptable solutions, and their 
culturally situated interpretive processes.”). 
 62. Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 553–58 (2018) (discussing 
the potential applicability of Title VII’s stereotype theory of liability to algorithms). 
 63. NOBLE, supra note 10, at 1–2 (pointing out that humans are behind the algorithm); see also Barocas & 
Selbst, supra note 21, at 677–84 (explaining that programmers may introduce bias into the algorithm when 
choosing training data or choosing a target variable). 
 64. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 128–35 (1980); see also 
WHITTAKER, ET AL., supra note 18, at 38–40. 
 65. P. Jonathon Phillips et al., An Other-Race Effect for Face Recognition Algorithms, 8 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS APPLIED PERCEPTION, Jan. 2011, at 14:1, 14:7; Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender 
Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. OF MACHINE 
LEARNING RES. 1 (2018), 1–2, http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html [https://perma.cc/HRR9-
69HX]. 
 66. Kate Crawford, Opinion, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html. This 
over-representation appears to be largest in terms of gender. See Yoan Mantha & Simon Hudson, Estimating the 
Gender Ratio of AI Researchers Around the World, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2018), https://medium.com/element-ai-
research-lab/estimating-the-gender-ratio-of-ai-researchers-around-the-world-81d2b8dbe9c3 (estimating a 
cross-country average of 88% of AI researchers being male, the number being 86.57% in the US); Tom Simonite, 
AI Is the Future—But Where Are the Women?, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-
intelligence-researchers-gender-imbalance/ (estimating that only 10-15% of A.I. research staff in Facebook and 
Google are women, and only 12% of researchers at major A.I. conferences are women). 
 67. Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of 
Fair Machine Learning 4 (Aug. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00023 (arguing 
that law’s reliance on intent is unsuited to deal with algorithmic systems). 
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comes from the humans involved in programming, training, and applying the 
algorithm.68 Even if there is no direct human intent over the outcome, there is 
always human involvement in how the decision is made. Also in machine 
learning algorithms, through data-gathering, feature selection, and choice of 
target variable, there is human involvement in any algorithmic model—trained 
or untrained. People must select what data can predict the relevant features, what 
features are important enough for the algorithm to consider in order to determine 
the output and, perhaps most importantly, people must choose the target variable 
that serves as a proxy for the desired output.69  
In sum, there is always, at some level, a human decision-maker that impacts 
the process. Biases in an algorithmic process often exist because human biases 
were translated into the system. These biases are inevitable, but they can be 
reduced when the environment forces them to be made explicit. 
D. BIASED SAMPLE DATA 
An algorithm can only be as good as the data that it is fed. If an algorithm 
is mining in a section of the dataset that, for any reason, is unrepresentative of 
the population, it will produce a non-representative output. 
Bias in the data has been explored by prior research, in particular by Solon 
Barocas and Andrew Selbst.70 The problem of biased data exists for both 
individual records in a dataset and for the dataset as a whole. Individual records 
may suffer from quality problems due to partial or even incorrect data. The entire 
dataset might have quality problems at higher rates for an entire protected class 
compared to others or might be unrepresentative of the general population.71  
These variations in the quality and representativeness of data may correlate 
with class membership and, in turn, negatively impact historically disadvantaged 
groups when used to make decisions about members of these groups.72 Since 
datasets involving historically disadvantaged groups can suffer data quality 
problems for a variety of reasons, such as underrepresentation, the use of these 
datasets can increase discriminatory outcomes.73 
This is a more sophisticated version of a standard statistics problem that is 
usually solved by obtaining more data as, according to the law of large numbers, 
when the sample is large enough it will resemble the population.74 In this 
 
 68. Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21, at 884. 
 69. Because there are theories of human behavior behind every algorithm, disparate treatment is applicable. 
Cf. id at 890–911 (arguing a different position: that disparate impact is, most of the time, inapplicable to machine 
learning algorithms, but Title VII includes a prohibition of classification bias that is consequence-based, but 
distinct from antisubordination). 
 70. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 684–86. 
 71. Id. at 684–87. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 61 (2013); Kate Crawford, 
Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/ 
05/09/think_again_big_data.  
 74. STEWART J. ANDERSON, BIOSTATISTICS: A COMPUTING APPROACH 60 (2012). This is, of course, as 
long as the sample is large enough that is unbiased with respect to the population. 
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context, however, obtaining more data often fails to solve the problem, either 
because the algorithm uses an already existing biased database or because it 
works through a machine learning process that continues to obtain biased 
samples. 75 Oftentimes, the data fed to algorithms suffer from a self-selection 
problem. 
To see how this may work in the analogue world, imagine that the New 
York Police Department decided to engage in predictive policing based solely 
on prior arrest numbers. If it had more of its police force in the Bronx than in 
other boroughs, then it would be likely to make more arrests there than anywhere 
else. This would lead to more comparative police presence in the Bronx, leading 
to more comparative arrests, and so on and so forth, independent of the actual 
crime rates.76  
This self-selection issue is more severe in algorithmic decision-making 
because any bias risks becoming systematic.77 This leads to an unhelpful 
feedback loop problem whereby algorithms find correlations in a biased dataset 
and then predict outcomes without taking into account the fact that bias tainted 
the training data. In successive rounds of analysis and prediction, the bias that 
began in the dataset then determines future outcomes. These predictions are then 
fed back into the algorithm, creating a vicious circle.78 
Predictive policing algorithms such as HunchLab and PredPol often work 
in a similar way: the algorithm detects crime patterns in a city, it predicts the 
likelihood of future crime per geographic area based on such patterns, and the 
police patrol not randomly, but according to such predictions.79 Because the 
police will invariably find more crime where it is looking for crime than where 
it is not, and the new data on arrests will be fed to the algorithm, this will lead 
 
 75. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 35, at 5 (“Although software engineers initially identify the correlations 
and inferences programmed into algorithms, Big Data promises to eliminate the human ‘middleman’ at some 
point in the process. Once data-mining programs have a range of correlations and inferences, they use them to 
project new forms of learning.” (footnote omitted)). 
 76. Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police 
Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U L. REV. 193, 193 (2019) (discussing how systemic 
data manipulation, falsifying police reports, unlawful use of force, planted evidence, and unconstitutional 
searches lead to systemic biases in datasets used for predictive policing); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact 
in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 118–19 (2017) (showing how data-driven policing risks perpetuating 
discrimination and proposing algorithmic impact statements to inform about potential disparate impact). 
 77. See, e.g., Tolga Bolukbasi et al., Man Is to Computer Programmer as Woman Is to Homemaker? 
Debiasing Word Embeddings 3 (July 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.06520.pdf 
(discussing how word embeddings can amplify gender bias); see also O’NEIL, supra note 8, at 200. 
 78. Lemley & Casey, supra note 51, at 57 (discussing the difficulties in granting effective remedies for 
discriminatory algorithmic decision-making due to this kind of feedback loop). 
 79. Aaron Shapiro, Reform Predictive Policing, 541 NATURE 458, 458 (2017) (“Geospatial modelling 
generates risk profiles for locations. Jurisdictions are divided into grid cells (each typically around 50 square 
metres), and algorithms that have been trained using crime and environmental data predict where and when 
officers should patrol to detect or deter crime.”); see also New Model Police, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2007), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2007/06/07/new-model-police. Like COMPAS, HunchLab (as well 
its main competitors such as PredPol) is a proprietary algorithm, so it is not possible to know exactly how it 
makes predictions. 
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to a feedback loop problem.80 A dataset with a feedback loop problem such as 
this one will be likely to adversely affect vulnerable minorities.81 
E. DATA THAT REFLECT A BIASED SOCIETY 
On January 22, reporter Ryan Saavedra attempted to ridicule Rep. 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez by sharing a video of her in which, in his words, she 
“claims that algorithms, which are driven by math, are racist.”82 In the over 
7,000 replies to the tweet (more than what tweets about algorithms usually 
receive), several researchers who work on algorithmic decision-makers, along 
with members of the public who linked to their articles, attempted to explain that 
she was correct. A few years ago, his statement would have gone unnoticed, but 
the public and policy attention to the ways in which algorithms can discriminate 
is on the rise.83 
A machine learning algorithm’s training data not only can be biased or 
incomplete, as discussed in the last Subpart, but can also reflect prior 
discrimination.84 If the training data are biased, as was the Amazon hiring 
algorithm’s data—which reflected the existing male dominance in the tech 
industry—the outcome will be biased.85 
An algorithmic process can produce a disparate impact even when trained 
with representative data.86 The difference between the biased data from the last 
Subpart and this type of bias is that, here, the data are representative of the 
 
 80. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE Oct. 2016, at 16 (running a 
simulation on PredPol that seems to indicate that the algorithm amplifes database biases due to feedback loops); 
Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing 1–2 (Dec. 22, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09847 (exploring when feedback loops occur). 
 81. See, e.g., Nathan Munn, Police in Canada Are Tracking People’s ‘Negative’ Behavior in a ‘Risk’ 
Database, VICE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kzdp5v/police-in-canada-are-tracking-
peoples-negative-behavior-in-a-risk-database (“[T]he algorithm underpinning PredPol, one of the most widely 
used predictive policing technologies, is fundamentally flawed in a way that can contribute to over-policing, 
particularly for marginalized communities.”). The Chicago Police Department’s Strategic Subject List is another 
example of the same problem. The Strategic Subject List’s algorithm predicts the likelihood of a person being 
involved in gun violence in the future, either as a victim or perpetrator. However, because the list was allegedly 
used by the police department as an informal suspect list for crimes involving gun violence, it was shown to be 
predictive not of involvement in future gun violence but of probability of being arrested in the future. See Jessica 
Saunders et al., Predictions Put into Practice: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive 
Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 363–64 (2016). 
 82. Ryan Saavedra (@RealSaavedra), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2019, 12:27 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
RealSaavedra/status/1087627739861897216. 
 83. See, e.g., John Burn-Murdoch, The Problem with Algorithms: Magnifying Misbehaviour, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/aug/14/problem-with-algorithms-
magnifying-misbehaviour; Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html. 
 84. See generally Calders & Žliobaitė, supra note 35. 
 85. Cook, supra note 42; Dastin, Amazon scraps secret AI, supra note 42; Dastin, Amazon scraps “sexist 
AI,” supra note 42; Iriondo, supra note 42. 
 86. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 691–92. 
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population, but this representative data still produce a disparate impact outcome 
because of embedded social inequalities.87 
To understand why a model trained with representative data may lead to 
disparate impact discrimination, we can refer to the idea of statistical 
discrimination.88 Imagine an employer-deployed algorithm that cannot observe 
each worker’s skill level, drawn from a normal, bell-shaped skill distribution. 
The algorithm, however, can observe two things. First, it can observe their group 
identity. We can define such identity in any way, such as P for purple hair and 
G for green hair. Second, it can observe a noisy or imprecise signal about each 
person’s productivity. Under the model, the question of statistical discrimination 
is the question of why two workers with the same productivity signal, but from 
different groups, are treated differently.89 
This differential treatment would take place under two scenarios: 
stereotyping and differential observability. Stereotyping takes place when all 
signals are equally informative of each individual’s productivity, but one group, 
P, has a lower average human capital investment,  potentially leading to lower 
average skill. Because the algorithm will take both group membership and the 
signal to be informative of each individual’s expected productivity, it will 
consider an employee from P to have a lower expected productivity than an 
employee from G that has the same signal.90 Therefore, P workers will receive 
a lower salary under the same signal, or they will be offered fewer jobs.  
Differential observability takes place when the skill distributions are 
identical in both groups, but the signals for P workers’ skills are less informative 
than those of G workers. This will lead the algorithm to consider the expected 
productivity of a P worker with any signal to be closer to that of the population 
average than the expected productivity of a G worker with the same (although 
less noisy) signal because the signals for G and for P will be given different 
weights. This, in turn, will lead highly qualified P workers to receive a lower 
salary than their G equivalents, and low qualified P workers to receive a higher 
salary than their G equivalents.91 
 
 87. Aylin Caliskan et al., Semantics Derived Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-Like 
Biases, 356 SCI. 183, 183 (2017). See generally NOBLE, supra note 10; DANIEL ROSENBERG, ET AL., “RAW 
DATA” IS AN OXYMORON (Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013). 
 88. Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 661 (1972); 
Kenneth. J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (Orley Ashenfelter 
& Albert Rees eds., 1973).  
 89. See Shelly Lundberg & Richard Startz, On the Persistence of Racial Inequality, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 292, 
292–95 (1998) (introducing a model showing that statistical discrimination in competitive markets and without 
differences in average human capital introduces inefficiencies in the system; due to statistical discrimination, 
minorities face lower incentives to invest in human capital, community social capital is lowered, and they 
develop lower levels of productivity). 
 90. As noted above, algorithms can only make predictions about the likelihood of a future event, and cannot 
predict any event: it can determine the likelihood of someone to be a productive employee, but not whether they 
will be one. 
 91. Hanming Fang & Andrea Moro, Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A 
Survey, in 1A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS 133, 137–40 (Jess Benhabib et al. eds., 2011). 
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While it is difficult to infer the type of statistical inference without looking 
at the data and how they were processed, one could imagine the COMPAS 
algorithm falling in stereotyping and the Amazon hiring algorithm falling in 
differential observability. COMPAS, as detailed below,92 was working with a 
dataset where black individuals had more arrests on average than white 
individuals due to embedded societal inequalities, and this fact led to its 
discriminatory outcome. Amazon’s algorithm had a database that was mostly 
male and could therefore learn about expected productivity for male candidates 
better than it did for female candidates,93 resulting in a discriminatory outcome 
of its own. If the data sample is representative of reality, it will also reflect the 
existing prejudices that exist. 
Some historically disadvantaged groups (including along the dimensions 
of race and gender) are protected from these types of statistical discrimination 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,94 even when the generalizations are 
true.95 There is agreement that statistical discrimination should be eradicated, 
but we lack ways of doing so effectively. As will be explored in the rest of this 
Article, antidiscriminatory information rules help inform efforts to address 
algorithmic discrimination.  
II. AN INFORMATION APPROACH TO ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION 
Because algorithmic decision-making is still human decision-making 
mediated by algorithms, we can build on our knowledge about how humans 
operate to evaluate how to regulate algorithms optimally.96 This Part explains 
when blocking information can prevent discrimination in human decision-
making and why these privacy rules blocking information are especially suited 
for algorithms. Antidiscriminatory information rules are especially warranted 
when it comes to algorithms because algorithmic bias is based directly on the 
information that algorithms are fed. It then explores the key challenge to apply 
this framework to algorithmic decision-making: data that are proxies for 
protected categories. The framework shows that the relationship between 
privacy and discrimination depends on the types of proxies that decision-makers 
rely on. 
A. PRIVACY RULES THAT PREVENT DISCRIMINATION 
Law often blocks personal information from human decision-makers in 
many areas (including in employment, health care, and banking) to prevent 
discrimination. In prior research, I proposed a framework for determining when 
personal information should flow and when it should not in order to prevent 
 
 92. See infra Subpart IV.C. 
 93. See supra Subpart I.A for an explanation of how machine learning algorithms learn.  
 94. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2012). 
 95. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716–17 (1978). 
 96. See infra Subpart II.A. 
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discrimination by humans. The success of these measures depends on what types 
of proxies exist for the information blocked.97  
While traditional approaches to discrimination respond to the way a 
decision-maker used information, a preventive approach bars decision-makers 
from even acquiring the information. This prevents the decision-maker from 
taking an action in violation of antidiscrimination law.98 It is therefore key to 
determine when personal information should flow in order to design privacy 
rules that prevent discrimination effectively. 99 
There are three conditions under which privacy rules reduce discrimination 
in a way that giving decision-makers more information does not.100 These 
scenarios help determine when an antidiscriminatory information rule is 
warranted.  
First, blocking certain data points can be useful when people do not update 
prior beliefs cleanly101—perhaps due to representativeness heuristics and 
confirmation biases.102 People have limited time and attention to receive 
information, even when the information is unlimited.103 Moreover, once people 
form a belief, most do not update their prior beliefs as cleanly as an ideal rational 
actor would when new information arrives.104 The importance of this effect will 
be different depending on context and on the informational demands of the 
decision. In algorithmic decision-making, this translates into bias in the 
process.105  
Second, blocking future information is useful when information samples 
are expected to be skewed and only a non-infinite amount of information can be 
gathered.106 In algorithmic decision-making, this translates into bias in the 
sample data.107  
 
 97. Cofone, supra note 11. 
 98. Lisa Austin, Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHILOS. 119, 144 (2003); Preempting 
Discrimination, supra note 12, at 440–41; Protecting Privacy, supra note 12, at 2100. 
 99. Cofone, supra note 11, at 40–41. 
 100. Id. at 13–15. This differs from the standard economic approach to the relationship between privacy and 
discrimination. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364 
(2008) (presenting such approach); see also infra Subpart II.B. 
 101. Cofone, supra note 11, at 150. 
 102. See generally David M. Grether, Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic, 
95 Q. J. ECON. 537 (1980); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
 103. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 9–10 (2001); 
Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L. J. 2063, 2063–64 (2001). 
 104. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 877 (2004); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007). 
 105. See infra Subpart II.B; see also Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable 
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1129 (2018). 
 106. Cofone, supra note 11, at 149–50. Therefore, the law of large numbers would not solve the biased data 
problem. 
 107. See infra Subpart II.C; see also Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1995–97 
(2017). 
G - COFONE_16 (TRANSMIT)(DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:31 PM 
1408 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1389 
Third, blocking information points can be a useful preventive mechanism 
when, due to larger societal values, the law simply does not want an information 
point to be considered even if it can be useful to a decision-maker.108 This is the 
case of intentional statistical discrimination, where a decision-maker purposely 
employs a heuristic for information cost saving, but that heuristic discriminates 
against a protected class. In algorithmic decision-making, it translates into data 
that reflect a biased society.109 
These rules can offer short-term protection from discrimination by 
blocking information that the law deems harmful in a decision-making process. 
When decision-makers’ samples are skewed, when they have processing errors 
such as behavioral biases, or when discrimination is intentional, blocking 
information might be more effective at preventing discrimination than allowing 
it to flow. In this way, privacy rules can aid antidiscriminatory efforts.110 
For all three scenarios, the key element in establishing an effective 
antidiscriminatory information rule is noting that, when information is blocked 
to prevent a discriminatory decision, oftentimes decision-makers use other 
information as proxies for such blocked information.111 For example, decision-
makers could use zip code as a proxy for race, or height as a proxy for gender. 
To be effective, the privacy rule must address those proxies as well. 
A crucial task for preventing discrimination through privacy rules, 
therefore, is identifying and blocking data points that are proxies for categories 
that the law protects. The types of proxies determine under which conditions 
blocking an information flow will successfully tackle discrimination. In 
algorithmic decision-making, we have little experience with different types of 
proxies. We hear of cases in which blocking information worsened 
discrimination but, as with human decision-makers, we do not yet know when it 
does work.112 
B. WHY PRIVACY RULES ARE ESPECIALLY SUITED FOR ALGORITHMS 
Oftentimes in economics, discrimination is described as a problem of not 
having enough information about others.113 According to this account, having 
insufficient information leads people to resort to heuristics to judge others, 
which can easily result in false opinions. These false opinions, in turn, are 
attributed to everyone who falls under the heuristic, resulting in beliefs that 
could be racist, sexist, or homophobic.114 Recall, for example, the two situations 
of statistical discrimination: stereotyping and differential observability. The 
problem would not exist if the employer had perfectly informative productivity 
 
 108. Cofone, supra note 11, at 151. 
 109. See infra Subpart II.D. 
 110. Cofone, supra note 11, at 149–51. 
 111. See infra Subpart III.A. 
 112. See infra Part III. 
 113. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 100, at 364, 380. 
 114. See id at 364. 
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signals.115 In other words, describing discrimination as a problem of not having 
enough information about others assumes that discrimination is of a statistical 
nature, rather than based on psychological biases. 
If discrimination were always statistical, making information about oneself 
more available would avoid the need for such heuristics and therefore reduce 
discrimination, while having more privacy would worsen it.116 Representing this 
view, Lior Strahilevitz has argued that “by increasing the availability of 
information about individuals, we can reduce decision-makers’ reliance on 
information about groups”117 and that, therefore, “there is often an essential 
conflict between information privacy protections and antidiscrimination 
principles, such that reducing privacy protections will reduce the prevalence of 
distasteful statistical discrimination.”118 The underlying idea of this economic 
view is that society should tolerate statistical discrimination because the only 
way to dispense with it is by providing decision-makers with more information 
in contexts where there may be a normative reason for which they should not 
have access to it.119 
This conclusion about the relationship between privacy and discrimination 
as being in tension operates under a strict set of assumptions: that humans are 
rational in their decision-making and they update biases cleanly.120 These 
assumptions rarely apply to human decision-making, which is not always 
statistical and rarely involves a fully rational updating of beliefs.121 However, 
the same cannot be said of algorithmic decision-making. 
The assumptions of statistical discrimination and rational Bayesian 
updating of beliefs do apply in a straightforward way to algorithmic decision-
making. Algorithms predict output variables based on data inputs. They are not 
irrational, they do not have prejudices, and they do not have limited time and 
attention. They operate precisely like the rational decision-maker of a standard 
economic model. 
This makes the economic arguments about privacy and discrimination 
more relevant than before. Blocking information from an algorithmic decision-
maker can only lead the system to perform more statistical inferences that are 
 
 115. See supra Subpart I.E.  
 116. See Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History 
Records, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 288–89 (2004). 
 117. Strahilevitz, supra note 100, at 364. 
 118. Id; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1682–88 (2008).  
 119. Strahilevitz, supra note 118, at 1723–36. Note that this suggestion cannot eliminate statistical 
discrimination—it can only make it more targeted. Providing more information may be effective as an individual 
strategy when information is not blocked for the decision-maker, but these measures, while effective for some 
individuals, cannot eliminate statistical discrimination. See, e.g., Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, 
Something to Talk About: Information Exchange under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 86–87 (2016) 
(finding that concealing family information lowers female applicants’ hiring prospects). 
 120. See Strahilevitz, supra note 100, at 364; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 118, at 1675; see infra Subart 
III.A. 
 121. Cofone, supra note 11, at 150.  
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potentially discriminatory. These inferences will differ depending on the 
availability of proxies.  
The limited applicability of the information approach to human decision-
making stems precisely from the source of people’s biases: privacy rules do not 
solve human biases. But algorithms’ biases are based on the information that we 
feed them. Their source of bias is the input. Unlike humans, algorithms cleanly 
update their decisions when the input is changed. Therefore, most of the reasons 
for the limited applicability of this method to humans do not exist for algorithms. 
Algorithms, in other words, are the rational decision-makers that humans 
can never be. The next Subpart will explore what this idea means for 
antidiscriminatory information rules in terms of the importance and impact of 
quality data. 
C. IT IS ALL IN THE DATA  
The discussion about algorithms above has illustrated that an algorithmic 
decision-making process can only be as good as the data that it uses. This insight 
about bias prevention is the reason why the conversation about algorithmic 
discrimination is a conversation about disparate impact. Without a focus on 
disparate impact, because the problem lies in the data and not in classifiers, the 
legal discussion on algorithmic discrimination has no grounding.122 
This takeaway shows that algorithmic bias precedes the algorithm, because 
the bias exists in the data that are fed to the algorithm.123 The data used to 
construct a machine learning system determine how the system interprets the 
world over which it operates to make predictions.124 It is all in the data sample 
(and the humans that make it). From this point of view, it is unsurprising that 
regulating such data is a promising approach to aid antidiscriminatory efforts.  
Because algorithmic bias precedes the algorithm, and because the bias 
exists in the data that are fed to the algorithm, antidiscriminatory information 
rules are, or should be, more useful to address algorithmic discrimination than 
they are for humans. Unlike humans, algorithms can block individual data-
points in the decision-making process. While it can be difficult to instruct a 
human decision-maker to disregard a visible fact, it is more feasible, even if not 
always simple, to code an algorithm to do so. One can program an algorithm to 
control for any variable. For example, comparing a hiring outcome when 
including applicants’ religious information and when blocking it. In other words, 
 
 122. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 671–74; Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra 
note 21. 
 123. Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Discerning Bias in Computer Systems, in INTERACT ‘93 AND 
CHI ‘93 CONF. COMPANION ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 141 (Stacey Ashlund et al. eds., 
1993), (separating preexisting, technical, and emergent biases, and arguing that freedom from bias should part 
of the normative criteria we use to select a system). 
 124. WHITTAKER ET AL., supra note 18, at 28; Bornstein, supra note 62, at 570 (“[A]ny improvement to 
traditional decision-making that relies on data will depend on what data is being used and how.”); Chander, 
supra note 39, at 1036 (arguing that the main problem with algorithmic discrimination is that the algorithms 
learn from data that already shows discriminatory effects). 
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unlike human decision-makers, algorithms can separate information collection 
from processing. Instead of blocking information from the algorithm, we can 
allow it to collect information and then decide whether to use it—for example 
by making the algorithm compare the potential decision with information and 
the counterfactual decision without information.125 
In other words, with an automated decision-making process, it is possible 
to collect all features and instruct the model to ignore one of those features while 
making a prediction.126 Despite the risk of amplifying bias when unchecked, if 
regulated appropriately algorithms can be productive for reducing 
discrimination. In some ways, we demand more from algorithmic decision-
making than we do from the human type because algorithms present the 
possibility of doing so. They do this in two different ways. 
The first is de-biasing. While it is true that human biases can be coded into 
the algorithm,127 the process of coding them makes them more explicit. This 
means that unconscious biases might be detected by the same programmer who 
holds them, or by subsequent reviewers, and not all biases will necessarily be 
transferred to the code.128 
The second is monitoring. The fact that algorithms are coded makes it 
easier to regulate algorithmic decision-makers than human ones, absent trade 
secrets. While faulty logic is only figuratively coded in human decision-makers, 
it is literally coded in algorithmic ones. While this is less of an advantage for 
algorithms that operate as a black box to decision-subjects, such as deep learning 
systems,129 oftentimes algorithms present an opportunity for accountability.130 
Because algorithmic discrimination is a problem of managing humans 
intermediated by an algorithm,131 it is not surprising that algorithmic 
 
 125. Matt Kusner et al., Counterfactual Fairness, 30 ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 4066, 
4075 (2017), http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6995-counterfactual-fairness.pdf. One way to implement this could be 
to train a model with the information of the protected category in the training data, then train a second model 
without such information in the training data, and compare the results of both models with each other through a 
difference in difference regression, and each result with different definitions of algorithmic fairness. This would 
allow, for example, for race to be blocked when training algorithm 1 and then use algorithm 2 to perform auditing 
steps to control for disparate impact in algorithm 1, while knowing who is white and who is black in the database; 
then, one can create different decision rules for black and white individuals that could be more accurate than a 
one size fits all rule. However, this would run into the disparate-impact disparate-treatment tension described in 
infra Subpart IV.A. 
 126. While possible, this may be ineffective unless the feature involved is independent, as discussed in infra 
Part III. 
 127. See generally Winner, supra note 64 (describing how technologies can be designed with patterns and 
biases within them). 
 128. See Bornstein, supra note 62, at 526; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 673–74, Data-Driven 
Discrimination, supra note 21, at 869–71; see also Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1055, 1058–59 (2017) (arguing that not using technologies, such as algorithms, to check subjective biases 
in hiring decisions should constitute discrimination under Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine). 
 129. See infra Subpart IV.D. 
 130. See Ignacio Cofone & Katherine Strandburg, Strategic Games and Algorithmic Secrecy, 64 MCGILL 
L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (evaluating when algorithms ought to be kept secret due to gaming and when gaming is 
not an obstacle for disclosure). 
 131. See supra Subpart I.B.  
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discrimination and human discrimination have a similar dynamic regarding 
information flows. Whether a person making the ultimately discriminatory 
decision did so intermediated by an algorithm is only relevant for determining 
how, and not whether, to regulate information to prevent the discriminatory act.  
The three conditions for the effectiveness of antidiscriminatory 
information rules previously described—skewed samples, processing problems 
(bias), and intent—132 are also applicable to algorithms. Skewed samples to 
make inferences produce biased outcomes in algorithms as they do in humans.133 
Similarly, a biased process (with prior beliefs that filter into the code) and 
discriminatory intent are possible from the people that are involved in designing 
and applying the algorithm.134 They can also (unknowingly to their designers) 
produce discriminatory outcomes when working with a database containing 
embedded social biases.135In other words, the algorithmic biases that can lead to 
discrimination (bias in the data that are used as an input and bias in the data-
processing mechanism) trace back to the effectiveness conditions for 
antidiscriminatory information rules.136  
The privacy solution to algorithmic discrimination, in this sense, is also to 
apply an information policy to algorithms, rather than only to human 
discrimination. However, there is an obstacle to regulating data to prevent bias 
and discrimination. As the next Subpart explores, blocking information is likely 
to make algorithmic discrimination only worse. Subpart D will then explore 
different formulations of the idea of never blocking information, and what this 
idea means for the question of how to prevent discrimination 
D. THE KEY CHALLENGE FOR PRIVACY RULES: THE ENDLESS LINE OF 
PROXIES OBJECTION 
When evaluating antidiscriminatory information rules, it is crucial to 
understand how systems identify proxies for information points that are 
proscribed by the law. Shifting discrimination from an information point to 
proxies is only possible when proxies for the blocked piece of information are 
available—especially when they are accurate and easily observable. The use of 
 
 132. See Subpart II.A. See generally Cofone, supra note 11. 
 133. See Subparts II.B, II.C. 
 134. See supra Subpart I.B; see also Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21, at 884 (discussing how 
employers can engage in intentional discrimination by “rel[ying] on an algorithm . . . because it knows the model 
produces a discriminatory result and intends that result to occur. . . . masquerade[ing] behind the neutral façade 
of data analysis . . . . [where] the pretext—the ‘legitimate business reason’ given for the decision—is the output 
of a computer model.”); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 692–93 (noting that employers can mask intentional 
discrimination by using an apparently neutral algorithm). 
 135. Algorithms can also be used by people with a discriminatory intent who try to do proxy laundering: 
choosing seemingly inoffensive proxies or facially neutral rules with the coveted intention of discriminating 
against a protected category. But this is not an algorithmic problem. Instead, it is a problem that 
antidiscrimination law has been addressing for as long as disparate impact discrimination has existed. The main 
challenge (besides additional probatory difficulties) that algorithms pose for antidiscrimination law is not 
intentional discrimination, but unintentional discrimination. 
 136. See generally Cofone, supra note 11. 
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those proxies by the system can have an equally negative or even more 
devastating outcome than would have resulted from using the blocked 
information in the original discriminatory decision. Therefore, it is crucial for 
any effective antidiscriminatory information rule to identify and block those 
information flows as well. Checking for the existence of these proxies is 
necessary for predicting the effectiveness of any antidiscriminatory information 
rules and of crucial importance for designing better ones. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that this is rarely possible with algorithms. The 
proxies that algorithmic processes might identify, or even the fact of whether an 
algorithm will identify a proxy at all, is difficult—and sometimes impossible—
to predict.  
To apply an information policy to algorithms, a crucial task is to identify 
which pieces of information are proxies for others.137 Blocking proxies for 
protected categories may be key for avoiding discriminatory outcomes.138 
However, two central problems have been identified for doing that. The first 
problem is that we may not know which those proxies are and, if we did, it may 
be impossible to block all proxies. The second problem is that, even if it is 
possible to block proxies, it may be undesirable as those proxies could also 
contain valuable information.  
The first problem is perhaps the most commonly heard objection in the 
industry. An algorithmic process could produce a disparate impact on a protected 
category due to correlations between pieces of information that were initially 
hard to predict.139 The reason for this is that a large number of features could 
correlate with the protected category only slightly, none of them altering the 
prediction significantly but all of them in aggregation doing so,140 so the removal 
of any one of them would make no significant difference. The Amazon hiring 
algorithm serves as an example of this as well. After realizing that the algorithm 
discriminated based on gender, Amazon modified it to ignore words that denoted 
gender. However, the algorithm continued to “guess” individuals’ gender by 
using other words in the resumes that correlated with gender.141 Moreover, 
 
 137. See infra Subpart III.A. 
 138. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 691; Bodie et al., supra note 16, at 1022–23. 
 139. Bodie et al., supra note 16, at 1023 (arguing that the use of algorithms risks other pieces of data being 
proxies for prohibited categories); Benjamin Alarie et al., How Artificial Intelligence Will Affect the Practice of 
Law, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 106, 116–17 (Supp. 2018) (“Machine learning’s agnostic approach—choosing an 
algorithm that maximizes predictive accuracy independent of underlying theory—enables it to leverage 
connections between and among references, even those that are implied rather than expressed.”); Hu, supra note 
16, at 641, 695 (explaining that algorithms can use data—like risk factors—that are not protected categories, but 
serve as proxies for protected categories). 
 140. See, e.g., Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of 
Human Behavior, 110 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 5802, 5805 (2013) (“[A] wide variety of 
people’s personal attributes, ranging from sexual orientation to intelligence, can be automatically and accurately 
inferred using their Facebook Likes. Similarity between Facebook Likes and other widespread kinds of digital 
records, such as browsing histories, search queries, or purchase histories suggests that the potential to reveal 
users’ attributes is unlikely to be limited to Likes. Moreover, the wide variety of attributes predicted in this study 
indicates that, given appropriate training data, it may be possible to reveal other attributes as well.”). 
 141. REUTERS, supra note 42. 
G - COFONE_16 (TRANSMIT)(DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:31 PM 
1414 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1389 
proxies can change their meaning over time and the proxies involved could be 
emergent: they may not be proxies before, but appear later in the process (a piece 
of information that was not a proxy for race in the past could become one in the 
future). 
The corollary problem is that, if one wanted to block all proxies for 
protected categories, one would never cease to find more information points that, 
to some degree, are predictive of each other and would need to be blocked.142 In 
that endeavor, one might have to block information ad infinitum. Moreover, in 
large databases, many of these proxies could be redundant with each other.143 
The potential that machine learning has for identifying new proxies is not a 
quirk, but the main interest in A.I. In other words, one could potentially design 
a system that blocks all proxies and develop neutral hiring practices if it had no 
information, but that would defeat the point of having such system.144 What 
would be left is randomness.  
The second problem is that, when one removes any information, one also 
takes away relevant information for decision-making.145 A feature that is a proxy 
for a protected category could also be a proxy for useful and legitimate 
information, implying that blocking information presents a tradeoff.146 For 
example, education may be predictive of race in some social contexts, but it is 
also predictive of job performance.  
More importantly, to achieve standards of algorithmic fairness, one must 
be aware of the way in which the model’s variables have differing predictive 
power among different protected groups.147 In order to assess whether the 
algorithm has resulted in disparate impact discrimination, it is essential to know 
the value of the sensitive variable. For example, if the algorithm is “race blind” 
 
 142. Toshihiro Kamishima et al., Fairness-Aware Learning Through Regularization Approach, in 2011 
IEEE 11TH INT'L CONF. ON DATA MINING WORKSHOPS 643, 643 (2011) (“[T]he simple elimination of sensitive 
features from calculations is insufficient for avoiding inappropriate determination processes, due to the indirect 
influence of sensitive information.”). 
 143. Solon Barocas et al., Fairness and Machine Learning: Limitations and Opportunities 41 (Sept. 4, 2018) 
(unpublished textbook), http://fairmlbook.org (“[S]everal features that are slightly predictive of the sensitive 
attribute can be used to build high accuracy classifiers for that attribute. In large feature spaces sensitive attributes 
are generally redundant given the other features.”). 
 144. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 675 (“Even in situations where data miners are extremely careful, 
they can still effect discriminatory results with models that, quite unintentionally, pick out proxy variables for 
protected classes.”). In addition, the authors note:  
Cases of decision making that do not artificially introduce discriminatory effects into the data mining 
process may nevertheless result in systematically less favorable determinations for members of 
protected classes. This is possible when the criteria that are genuinely relevant in making rational 
and well-informed decisions also happen to serve as reliable proxies for class membership.  
Id. at 691. See generally Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2018) 
(explaining how algorithmic decision-making works with proxies in a dynamic setting).; James Grimmelmann 
& Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV ONLINE 164 (2016). 
 145. Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21, at 897-901. See generally Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness 
Through Awareness, in PROC. OF THE 3RD INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE CONF. 214 
(2012), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2090236.2090255; Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 144. 
 146. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 144, at 171. 
 147. Dwork et al., supra note 145, at 18. 
G - COFONE_16 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:31 PM 
August 2019] ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION 1415 
and the category of race is removed from the input data, then it will be 
impossible to determine whether the output is discriminatory on the basis of 
race. Therefore, blocking information may not only reduce accuracy but could 
also be self-defeating by reducing the ability to detect bias.148 
This objection is also sometimes raised by industry members. The Google 
whitepaper on Perspectives on Issues in AI Governance, for example, states that: 
[I]nferring race can be essential to check that systems aren’t racially 
biased, but some existing laws around discrimination and privacy can 
make this difficult. Similarly, while it might seem sensible to bar the 
inference of a person’s gender to guard against unfair treatment, in 
practice doing so could inadvertently have the opposite effect, by 
making it harder to deliver reliable ‘mathematically fair’ gender-
neutral outputs. We urge policymakers and experts to work together 
to identify where this kind of inadvertent counter-intuitive harm 
arises.”149  
Consequently, the first step to remove discrimination, according to this line 
of reasoning, is to increase the algorithm’s accuracy.150 The reason is simple: 
accuracy decreases error rates that are often discriminatory towards 
disadvantaged groups, as Strahilevitz argues for statistical discrimination. 
Collecting more data, and especially data about protected categories, is therefore 
a useful first step to reduce discrimination.151 
In sum, because of machine learning algorithms’ computational capacity, 
simply blocking information like the law does with human subjects may more 
often than not be impossible, ineffective, or undesirable. When aiming to prevent 
race discrimination, for example, one may find that a host of attributes in the 
United States correlate in some way with race. Some of those may be 
unexpected, and some of those may be legitimate considerations for the decision. 
This idea has dominated much of the discourse around algorithmic 
discrimination: blocking information about protected categories will be 
ineffective, so there is nothing that one can do ex-ante to prevent algorithmic 
discrimination. The next Part qualifies this position. 
 
 148. Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21, at 917–18. 
 149. GOOGLE, PERSPECTIVES ON ISSUES IN AI GOVERNANCE 15 (2018). 
 150. Accuracy can be defined as the proportion of examples of which the model produces a true positive or 
true negative result. GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 31, at 101–02; see also Amina Adadi & Mohammed 
Berrada, Peeking Inside the Black-Box: A Survey on Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), 6 IEEE ACCESS 
52138, 52141, tbl. 1 (2018) (defining accuracy as the “performance metric that refers to the number of correct 
predictions made by the model” over all predictions made). 
 151. Kroll et al., supra note 15, at 685; see, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program Used for 
Bail and Sentencing Decisions was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not that Clear, WASH. POST, 
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-
racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/. 
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III. FOCUS ON DATA REGULATION, NOT ALGORITHMIC REGULATION  
Laws that govern A.I. can play a significant role in how A.I. learns and acts 
in the world.152 This Article showed so far that the law often regulates 
information to prevent discrimination but does so with varied effectiveness 
because of the sources of human bias.153 Algorithmic bias, on the other hand, is 
based directly on the information that the algorithms are fed. Therefore, their 
bias can be addressed by changing their information input. But blocking 
information on protected categories may be ineffective because an infinite 
number of data points will be proxies for them. 
Since regulating the availability and types of information points available 
is essential to regulating algorithmic processes, this Part shows that not all 
proxies are harmful and sometimes a change from an information point to its 
proxy is desirable. It then shows when blocking information does not fall under 
the objection about the endless line of proxies. Finally, and most importantly, it 
shows that changing data input does not necessarily mean blocking information 
about protected categories. Rather than blocking information, we can either 
encode or shape it. The first two Subparts qualify the objection that it is 
impossible to block all proxies for protected categories and show that the 
objection’s range of applicability is narrower than often assumed. The third and 
fourth Subparts show how to overcome the problem when the objection applies. 
A. NOT ALL PROXIES ARE BAD PROXIES 
When an information point is blocked, decision-makers who try to gauge 
it, algorithmic or human, are forced into using different information that may 
serve as a proxy. The three categories of proxies that an algorithm can be forced 
into are transfer proxies, reducing proxies, and expanding proxies.154 The 
difference between them depends on the relationship between the baseline 
population (referred to as the ‘information-point’ group) and the targeted group 
when the proxy is used (the ‘proxy group’). 
Transfer proxies lead algorithms to, instead of targeting the protected 
‘information-point’ group, target a different group that has some overlap with 
the ‘information-point’ group (see Figure 1). As a result, the subset of the 
‘information-point’ group that does not overlap with the new proxy group will 
be protected from discrimination, and the subset that overlaps between both 
groups will see no change in their situation. However, the subset of the ‘proxy 
group’ that does not overlap with the ‘information-point’ group will see their 
situation worsened: they will face discrimination while they did not before.155 
 
 152. See generally Levendowski, supra note 16. 
 153. Cofone, supra note 11, at 150. 
 154. Cofone, supra note 11, at 154–58.  
 155. Id. at 155. 
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Figure 1: Illustrates transfer proxies 
Reducing proxies narrow down discrimination to a subset of the 
‘ìnformation-point’ group (see Figure 2). Unlike transfer proxies, they do not 
target new individuals. Instead, they benefit some members of the ‘information-
point’ group (those that are not part of the ‘proxy group’), and leave the members 
of the ‘proxy group’ in the same situation as before the proxy was used.156 
 
Figure 2: Illustrates reducing proxies 
Expanding proxies have the opposite effect of reducing proxies (see Figure 
3). The ‘information-point group,’ for expanding proxies, is a subset of the 
‘proxy group’. As a result, the target of discrimination is difussed among 
members of the ‘proxy group’ in a probabilistic fashion, instead of being focused 
on members of the ‘information-point’ group.157 
 
 156. Imagine an industry with an aversion towards hiring Latinos. Imagine that, although being Latino is 
unobservable, Spanish-sounding first or last names serve as proxies. To mitigate discrimination, policy-makers 
could enforce a system that requires resumes to only contain initials for first names. As a result, decision-makers 
would only be able to use last names as proxies for being Latino. This would reduce discrimination from the 
larger ‘Spanish-sounding first name or last name’ information group to the smaller ‘Spanish-sounding last name’ 
proxy group. Indiivduals with a Spanish-sounding first name but without a Spanish-sounding last name would 
be protected from discrimination. This would not solve the problem, as individuals with Spanish-sounding last 
names will still be targets of discrimination, but it would create an improvement over the prior situation. Id. 
 157. For example, imagine an employer who wants to avoid hiring someone who might take a maternity 
leave in the near future. Most jurisdictions prohibit asking this question. Many scholars argue that this 
prohibition may lead employers to disadvantage all women. However, the employer will not disadvantage this 
larger group of candidates as much as it would have disadvantaged candidates whom it asks about maternity 
Info. point
Proxy
Info. point
Proxy
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Figure 3: Illustrates expanding proxies 
When proxies for protected categories blocked from decision-makers are 
available, blocking them as well may seem like the most effective method to 
prevent discrimination. There are few situations in which the problematic data 
will be what computer scientists call an independent feature of the model: an 
information point that is not significantly correlated with other features or 
information points. Put differently, sometimes the information on an 
individual’s membership of a protected category, or one of its proxies, will not 
be correlated with other pieces of information that the algorithm uses. This 
situation will be infrequent. If the protected category is an independent feature, 
then blocking the protected category is possible without falling into the problem 
of the endless line of proxies.158 Traditional statistical methods allow us to 
determine when this is the case.159 
But more importantly, some proxies, while impossible or unfeasible to 
block, may be inoffensive or may improve the situation compared to one in 
which an algorithm uses information about a protected category. Even if there is 
an endless line of proxies for the protected category, some of those may diffuse 
or reduce the discrimination in a way that makes it desirable to shift the 
algorithm into those proxies.  
Shifting discrimination from one population to another through transfer 
proxies is generally undesirable as it harms a new group of individuals. 
However, antidiscriminatory information rules can be designed to reduce the 
size of the targeted group through reducing proxies. Alternatively, expanding 
proxies can be used to diffuse discrimination among a larger group in a 
probabilistic fashion, and avoid targeting any one group directly.160 
Several considerations will determine whether the use of reducing or 
expanding proxies is desirable. It would be undesirable to use expanding or 
reducing proxies if the proxy group is one that has been historically protected by 
legislatures or is particularly vulnerable—for example because it is 
 
leave and obtains a positive answer; without asking being allowed, any of these candidates will only have a 
probability of going on maternity leave. See id. at 156–57. 
 158. See supra Subpart II.D. 
 159. For example, one could run a Chi-square test with attention to how high the power is. 
 160. Cofone, supra note 11, at 157. 
Proxy
Info. 
point
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intersectional. For expanding proxies, because the process is probabilistic, the 
relative sizes of the proxy groups matter; these proxies will be useful when the 
information is diffused among a larger group (ideally the entire population).161 
It will also be desirable to make an algorithm shift to these proxies when 
traditional antidiscrimination law is more effective at addressing the remaining 
discrimination against the proxy group—for example because it is larger.162 
In other words, for antidiscriminatory information rules to be effective, 
they need not block all proxies.163 They must instead identify proxies that reduce 
or expand the group of people that are discriminated against and gauge those 
proxies’ usefulness in helping protected categories.164  
B. WHEN TO BLOCK INFORMATION DESPITE PROXIES 
The last Subpart showed that it may sometimes be desirable to make 
decision-makers shift from an information point to some types of proxies. 
However, even when there are undesirable proxies, it may be desirable to block 
information on protected categories. 
The salient characteristic of machine learning algorithms for 
antidiscriminatory information rules is that, for these algorithms, there is 
evidence of the ineffectiveness of blindness as a fairness principle.165 This 
problem exists because machine learning algorithms are more emergent than 
knowledge-based systems: the outcome is more difficult to predict for the 
humans that make and apply them.166 
For human decision-making, the law and social norms use blindness 
frequently. For example, in a double-blind peer review, reviewers cannot see the 
personal characteristics of the author whose paper they are reviewing in the hope 
 
 161. In the maternity leave example, it is unlikely that an employer will stop hiring all women. However, it 
is possible that an employer will avoid hiring all members of a relatively smaller group, such as a religious 
minority group or an intersectional group. Consider a scenario where an employer wants to avoid hiring Muslim 
women who wear a veil. A policymaker who wants to devise information rules to protect them should evaluate 
how many Muslim women choose to wear a veil. If most do, then blocking the information might lead employers 
to use being Muslim as a proxy for wearing a veil, and shift discrimination to all Muslim women. Instead of 
protecting some women from discrimination, this shift would introduce discrimination towards every member 
of a larger group. Contrary to the policy’s aims, it would worsen the situation. The question of whether to make 
the probabilistic shift in these two examples may appear similar, but the groups’ relative sizes lead to opposite 
policy conclusions. See Id. 
 162. Id. at 157–58. 
 163. See Cofone, supra note 11. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Dwork et al., supra note 145, at 7. Blindness is the idea of not looking at the protected attribute when 
making a decision. 
 166. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 538–45 (2015) (explaining 
emergence as one of the disruptive characteristics of robotics for the law); Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics 
Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 45, 45–51 (2015) (“I do not distinguish sharply between robots and artificial 
intelligence (AI) agents . . . . We may be misled if we insist on too sharp a distinction between robotics and AI 
systems . . . .”); Cofone, supra note 14, at 185 (“[E]mergence will determine the extent to which an A.I. agent’s 
behavior is foreseeable to people who have free will and who live under the rule of law—which is fundamental 
to determining liability under tort law.”). 
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that such rule will lead them to be more objective. Similarly, at McGill 
University we blind all exams with an anonymous exam code to help professors 
be more objective while grading. This idea can be easily extended to knowledge-
based systems. The effectiveness of these measures can be persuasively 
contested, as can their applicability to other contexts, but for human decision-
makers and knowledge-based systems, it at least makes some sense. 
For machine learning algorithms, it seemingly does not. In machine 
learning, when there is a fair sample and no processing problems, algorithmic 
bias is often a side-effect of maximizing accuracy with regards to the chosen 
variable.167 When bias is a side-effect of accuracy, unlike prejudice, it functions 
like statistical discrimination. Recall the example above of people with green 
hair and purple hair.168 If there is differential observability, where people with 
purple hair have less traditional educational credentials than people with green 
hair and, therefore, less observable proxies for skill, maximizing accuracy will 
lead to disproportionately hiring people with green hair.  
Moreover, machine learning is much better at detecting proxies from the 
dataset than is any human decision-maker. We may block hair color from the 
database, but a machine learning algorithm may induce it from a number of data 
points that correlate to it.169  
The natural exception to this rule, then, is when the information does not 
improve accuracy. A situation where one should block information from a 
machine learning model, for example, is label leakage, where some of the input 
data filter into the label in a way that they reduce the model’s accuracy.170 Take 
a real-world example from a cancer prediction machine learning model. The 
model was trained to predict the probability of a patient having cancer based on 
his or her medical records.171 The algorithm picked up features from these 
records such as age, test results, and gender. Although the model had satisfactory 
predictions on the test data,172 it performed poorly when applied to new 
 
 167. See supra Subpart II.C. See generally Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised 
Learning, 30 ADVANCES NEURAL PROCESSING SYS. 1 (2016) http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6374-equality-of-
opportunity-in-supervised-learning.pdf (quantifying this idea with simulated data baseed on FICO scores). 
 168. See supra Subpart II.D. 
 169. Barocas et al., supra note 143, at 41 (“Some have hoped that removing or ignoring sensitive attributes 
would somehow ensure the impartiality of the resulting classifier. Unfortunately, this practice is usually 
somewhere on the spectrum between ineffective and harmful. In a typical data set, we have many features that 
are slightly correlated with the sensitive attribute. Visiting the website pinterest.com, for example, has a small 
statistical correlation with being female.”). 
 170. Marzyeh Ghassemi et al., Opportunities in Machine Learning for Healthcare 4 (2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.00388.pdf; Truyen Tran et al., Preterm Birth Prediction: Deriving 
Stable and Interpretable Rules from High Dimensional Data, in PROC. OF MACHINE LEARNING FOR 
HEALTHCARE 2016 at 3 (2016) http://proceedings.mlr.press/v56/Tran16.pdf. 
 171. Shachar Kaufman et al., Leakage in Data Mining: Formulation, Detection, and Avoidance, in PROC. 
OF THE 17TH ACM SIGKDD INT'LCONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 556, 557 (2011), 
https://www.cs.umb.edu/~ding/history/470_670_fall_2011/papers/cs670_Tran_PreferredPaper_LeakingInData 
Mining.pdf. 
 172. Having held out data to keep training data separate from testing data, as is best practice. 
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patients.173 It turns out that one of the features that the model learned from 
patients’ medical records was the hospital where they were being treated.174 
Many hospitals specialize in caring for cancer patients, so these hospitals were 
highly predictive of whether the patient had cancer: being treated in a hospital 
that specializes in cancer treatment highly correlates with having cancer.  
This effect was increased for institutions with the word “cancer” in it, but 
the first effect prevailed even when anonymizing hospital names.175 The new 
patients that this model was designed to be applied to, however, lacked this 
information. The aim of the model was to use it to determine the probability of 
a patient having cancer for it to help in the allocation of patients among hospitals. 
Showing the model the hospital names was cluing the model into a doctor’s 
diagnosis that the new patients, who the model was supposed to be applied to, 
lacked.176 The model would have performed better in its predictions without 
such information. Label leakage in this case led to problems identifying cancer 
patients, but it could also lead, for example, to problems identifying productive 
employees if a model took labeled features in a similar way. 
In sum, blocking information on protected categories when there are 
proxies available is rarely a first best solution but, in some situations, such as 
label leakage, blocking information may nonetheless be desirable. 
C. LEARNING FROM UTOPIA: SHAPING THE DATA 
As mentioned above, there are few situations in which the problematic data 
may be an independent feature of the model. But we should assume the most 
difficult, and most frequent, case: that the protected category is deeply linked to 
a long line of proxies. There is an alternative between unhelpfully blocking 
sensitive attributes and passively allowing for the discrimination they may 
produce: not blocking the data, but altering them.  
I suggest two ways of doing this. The first way, explored in this Subpart, 
is shaping the data. In some way, this is to “lie” to the algorithm, pretending that 
we live in the kind of society that we want to live in. The other, explored in the 
following Subpart, is encoding protected categories in the training data instead. 
Imagine that Amazon had trained its machine learning algorithm with a 
gender balanced sample of its employees. Or imagine that the data fed into 
COMPAS had been racially balanced. They would have not produced their 
highly criticized results. 
 
 173. Kaufman et al., supra note 171, at 557–58; see also Claudia Perlich et al., Breast Cancer Identification: 
KDD CUP Winner’s Report, 10 SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS 2, 39–40 (2008) https://www.kdd.org/ 
exploration_files/KDDCup08-P1.pdf (describing that the Patient ID input variable sometimes contained 
information that resulted in label leakage, such as the name of the institution, or the type of medical advice). 
 174. Id. at 561–62. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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Note that COMPAS was not biased as a measure of re-arrest; it was biased 
as a measure of re-offense.177 COMPAS used its prediction of re-arrest as a 
proxy for re-offence. In doing so, it picked up the social biases that distort the 
relationship between offending and being arrested. Similarly, the Amazon 
employment algorithm was not biased in measuring Amazon’s historical hiring 
practices. It was biased as a measure for Amazon’s best job candidates because 
social biases interfered in the relationship between Amazon’s historical hires 
and Amazon’s current best job candidates. In other words, the problem is the 
human decision of using re-arrest as a proxy for re-offending and past hires as a 
proxy for best hires. This is what generates a statistical bias, or a difference 
between the estimator’s expected value and its true value, similar to the 
simplified problem above between people with green hair and people with 
purple hair.178 Because the choice of proxy generated the statistical bias, it is 
reasonable to require that statistical measures are taken to correct for such bias 
if the decision falls under disparate impact discrimination. 
Because disparate impact discrimination is a problem of adversely 
affecting protected populations without a classification bias (which is a bias in 
the process), it is, in a way, a data input problem. Unlike humans, algorithmic 
bias is based directly on the information that the algorithms are fed: they do not 
keep irrational impermeable biases, but their biases are heuristics.179 To address 
these biases, companies and government agencies could be required to modify 
the training data.180 In other words, to conform with antidiscrimination law, they 
could be required to consider that, even though groups are not equal in the real 
world, they must be treated equally for the purposes of the decision-making 
process, and could be asked to train their models to conform to such belief. This 
can be achieved through pre-processing, or sanitizing, the data with which a 
machine learning model is trained.181 
 
 177. Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, in PROC. OF THE 
23RD ACM SIGKDD INT'LCONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 797, 803, fig. 2 (2017) (noting 
that calibration of COMPAS was satisfactory in the sense that the predictive accuracy of re-arrest was the same 
for both groups). 
 178. See supra Subpart I.E. 
 179. Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 191 (2017) 
(explaining that bias in machine learning is caused by social processes that are reflected in the data). 
 180. See, e.g., Flavio P. Calmon et al., Optimized Pre-Processing for Discrimination Prevention, in 30 
ADVANCES NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 3993 (2017), https://papers.nips.cc/paper/6988-optimized-pre-
processing-for-discrimination-prevention.pdf (proposing a probabilistic framework for discrimination-
preventing preprocessing that results in fairer classifications with slightly reduced accuracy); Indrė Žliobaitė, 
Fairness-Aware Machine Learning: A Perspective (Aug. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.00754.pdf (arguing that preventing discrimination requires an understanding of how 
it appears in machine learning and expressing the concern that, without such understanding, too overly strict 
regulations may occur). 
 181. Pre-processing approaches, which modify the source data, exist in opposition to in-processing 
approaches, which modify the algorithm to add antidiscrimination constrains, and post-processing approaches, 
which fix the resulting model. See Brian d’Alessandro et al., Conscientious Classification: A Data Scientist’s 
Guide to Discrimination-Aware Classification, 5 BIG DATA 120, 129–30 (2017) (explaining such distinction); 
Sara Hajian and Josep Domingo-Ferrer, A Methodology for Direct and Indirect Discrimination Prevention in 
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While the purpose of this Article is to propose to regulate information to 
prevent algorithmic discrimination, and not to develop technical methods to 
achieve this, it is important to note that these methods exist. Building on this 
knowledge, we can find an alternative in between unhelpfully blocking 
information about protected categories and passively allowing for disparate 
impact discrimination. 
There are different technical ways of addressing the distribution of data to 
train machine learning algorithms. One such method is developing a separate, 
tunable, de-biasing algorithm that adjusts the sampling probabilities of each data 
point during the training stage: it learns the structure of the data and changes the 
weights of different data points during training.182 Because probabilities are 
adjusted during training, such method can also aid with unknown biases in the 
training data without the need to label protected categories in such data.183 This 
method has been tested, for example, on facial detection algorithms achieving 
both an increase in accuracy and decrease in race and gender biases.184  Re-
sampling and re-weighting are similar. Re-sampling compares the expected size 
of a group to its actual size and samples accordingly, possibly duplicating data 
points, to achieve a fair distribution.185 Reweighing, similarly, changes each 
individuals’ weight to neutralize inequalities embedded in the historical data. 186 
 
Data Mining, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENG’G 25, no. 7, 1445 (2013) (proposing data 
mining systems that are discrimination-conscious by-design). Some in-processing techniques are naïve Bayes 
models, logistic regression, hinge loss, support vector machines, adaptive boosting, decision trees, and 
classification. Some post-processing techniques are classification and rule & pattern mining. See Toon Calders 
& Sicco Verwer, Three Naive Bayes Approaches for Discrimination-Free Classification, 21 DATA MINING 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 277, 288–90 (2010) (utilizing naive Bayes models); Muhammad Bilal Zafar et al., 
Fairness Constraints: Mechanisms for Fair Classification (Mar. 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.05259 (utilizing logistic regression, hinge loss, support vector machines); Benjamin 
Fish et al., A Confidence-Based Approach for Balancing Fairness and Accuracy, in PROC. OF THE 2016 SIAM 
INT'LCONF. ON DATA MINING 144 (Sanjay Chawla Venkatasubramanian & Wagner Meira eds., 2016), 
https://epubs.siam.org/doi/abs/10.1137/1.9781611974348.17 (utilizing logistic regression, support vector 
machines, adaptive boosting); Faisal Kamiran et al., Discrimination Aware Decision Tree Learning, in 2010 
IEEE INT'LCONF. ON DATA MINING 869 (2010) (utilizing decision trees); Richard Zemel et al., Learning Fair 
Representations, 28 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 325 (2013) (utilizing in-processing classification). See 
Dwork et al., supra note 145 (applying post-processing classification); Faisal Kamiran et al., Decision Theory 
for Discrimination-Aware Classification, in 2012 IEEE 12TH INT'LCONF. ON DATA MINING 924 (2012) (applying 
post-processing classification); Dino Pedreschi et al., Measuring Discrimination in Socially-Sensitive Decision 
Records, in PROC. OF THE 2009 SIAM INT'LCONF. ON DATA MINING 581–92 (Chid Apte et al. eds., 2009) 
(applying rule and pattern mining); see also Lehr & Ohm, supra note 17, at 683 (describing a data cleaning stage 
in their eight-stage model of machine learning, although focusing their description on cleaning for accuracy and 
missing values). 
 182. Alexander Amini et al., Uncovering and Mitigating Algorithmic Bias Through Learned Latent 
Structure, in AIES CONF. (2019), http://www.aies-conference.com/wp-content/papers/main/AIES-
19_paper_220.pdf. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Faisal Kamiran & Toon Calders, Data Preprocessing Techniques for Classification Without 
Discrimination, 33 IN KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS. 1 (2012) (developing three pre-processing techniques: 
suppressing the sensitive attribute, changing class labels, and reweighing or resampling data). 
 186. Id. 
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By pre-processing data, it is possible to modify the historical data that contain 
embedded inequality and translates it to models trained with it that would 
amplify it, to strip such data from discrimination. Pre-processing, in other words, 
modifies the training data to strip them from embedded bias that leads to 
disparate impact discrimination, to then train the model with fair data. This can 
be done either by modifying the input data generally,187 or by modifying the 
target variable (race, gender, etc.).188 
We saw above how blocking protected categories is ineffective to prevent 
algorithmic discrimination.189 However, that does not mean that having more 
data is always better. If we are concerned with algorithmic disparate impact, and 
we believe that antidiscrimination law may not be equipped to adequately 
address it ex-post, then we must regulate the data. To succeed in doing this, 
rather than more data or less data, we need fair data. 
Fair data, counterintuitively, means data samples that are unrepresentative 
of the pool, because it looks like what we believe the pool would look like had 
it not embedded structural inequalities. Fair data, or more meaningful data 
means, in some way, a “biased” data sample that counterweights social biases.  
D. ACTIONABLE PRIVACY: ENCODING THE DATA  
For some types of algorithms, applying the abovementioned approach is 
difficult because the model keeps learning while it is applied. These models are 
usually called reinforced learning models. Reinforced learning adds another 
layer of complexity to the regulation of information because the model’s 
learning power is not limited to training data.190 It is difficult, therefore, to 
control what the algorithm learns if it is being applied “in the wild.” A possible 
intermediate solution for reinforced learning algorithms, in between uselessly 
blocking labels for protected categories and unhelpfully allowing the algorithm 
to mine all information and reach disparate impact outcomes, is to encode the 
data. While this method is far from perfect, it allows for group fairness to be 
built into the system. 
This idea builds on the consideration explored above that, without 
incorporating sensitive features, it is impossible to correct for the impact of those 
sensitive features in other parts of an individual’s “data package.”191 The 
 
 187. See Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact, in PROC. 21ST ACM SIGKDD 
INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 259 (2015); Zemel et al., supra note 181. 
 188. See generally Faisal Kamiran & Toon Calders, Classifying Without Discriminating, in PROC. 2ND INT’L 
CONF. ON COMPUTER, CONTROL AND COMMC’N (2009) (introducing a model trained with “biased” data using a 
ranking function, which works impartially with future data, reducing discrimination in future classifications); 
Koray Mancuhan & Chris Clifton, Combating Discrimination Using Bayesian Networks, 22 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE L. 211 (2014); Faisal Kamiran et al., Quantifying Explainable Discrimination and Removing 
Illegal Discrimination in Automated Decision Making, 35 KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS. 613 (2013). 
 189. See supra Subpart III.B. 
 190.  See generally Shahin Jabbari et al., Fairness in Reinforcement Learning, 70 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING 
RES. 1617 (2017) (explaining the additional challenges of defining fairness in a reinforcement learning process). 
 191. See supra Subpart II.D. 
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algorithm, in other words, cannot be “race blind” and, at the same time, not 
engage in disparate impact discrimination.192 Luckily, this is a problem that 
antidiscrimination law has been addressing for a long time. It is also a problem 
that the regulation of personal information for decision-makers has been 
addressing for a long time.193 
As we do with human decision-makers, we can turn to different ways to 
obfuscate the data. For human decision-makers, these data are sometimes 
blocked: the law prevents decision-makers from accessing the information to 
prevent them from using it unfairly.194 For algorithms, instead of being blocked, 
the data can be encoded. 
The first way to do this is through what is referred to as actionable privacy. 
Machine learning research has shown that fair outcome-based models may be 
learned by incorporating, and at the same time encrypting, individuals’ sensitive 
attributes.195 
One way of implementing this is through multi-party computation. With 
such method, it is possible to encrypt attributes that denote membership of a 
protected category while keeping statistical data on protected categories.196 The 
procedure is as follows. First, users encrypt their personal data. Then, they send 
it to the company.197 After that, the company engages in multi-party 
computation alongside a regulatory body. In such way, neither the company nor 
regulator know all information at one time.198 In other words, nobody can see all 
sensitive information.  
Actionable privacy is different from differential privacy. A guarantee of 
differential privacy is the promise that, given the model, anonymization cannot 
be reverted; it is a model inversion guarantee.199 For example, iOS uses 
differential privacy to report app usage to Cupertino: the system adds random 
noise so that Apple can collect the aggregated data for statistical purposes 
 
 192. Niki Kilbertus et al., Blind Justice: Fairness with Encrypted Sensitive Attributes, 80 PROC. MACHINE 
LEARNING RES. 2630 (2018). 
 193. See supra Subpart III.A. See generally Cofone, supra note 11. 
 194. Cofone, supra note 11, at 11. 
 195. Kilbertus et al., supra note 192; see also Michael Veale & Reuben Binns, Fairer Machine Learning in 
the Real World: Mitigating Discrimination Without Collecting Sensitive Data, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Nov. 20, 
2017, at 5 (proposing to use third parties that hold individuals’ sensitive data); James E. Johndrow & Kristian 
Lum, An Algorithm for Removing Sensitive Information: Application to Race-Independent Recidivism Prediction 
11–12 (Mar. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.04957v1 (proposing a method to 
eliminate bias from predictive models by removing all information regarding protected variables from the 
training data and applying such method to COMPAS dataset). 
 196. See generally Kilbertus et al., supra note 192. 
 197. Id. at 2632. 
 198. Id. at 2632-34. 
 199. CYNTHIA DWORK & AARON ROTH, THE ALGORITHMIC FOUNDATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 1 
(2014); Kobbi Nissim et al., Bridging the Gap Between Computer Science and Legal Approaches to Privacy, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 713–33 (2018), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/37355739 (applying Dwork’s 
differential privacy model to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974); Alexandra Wood et al., 
Differential Privacy: A Primer for a Non-Technical Audience, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 218–20 (2018). 
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without becoming aware of the identity of the app users.200 With differential 
privacy, but not with actionable privacy, information about protected categories 
that could be helpful to detect discrimination is lost. In other words, differential 
privacy is the algorithmic equivalent of blocking information to algorithms like 
we do with humans, while actionable privacy is a method for encoding it instead. 
Another way to achieve some degree of obfuscation is through fair 
representation. Computer science research has developed means of “finding an 
intermediate representation of the data that best encodes the data (i.e. preserving 
as much information about the individual’s attributes as possible) while 
simultaneously obfuscat[ing] aspects of it, removing any information about 
membership with respect to the protected subgroup.”201 Put differently, it 
develops a representation of the data that preserves the information that the 
algorithm needs while encoding sensitive attributes. That allows the algorithm 
to capture useful information on group identity while at the same time blinding 
the process as to whether each individual is a member of the protected category 
through encoded representation.202 Each individual is mapped in a probability 
distribution of a new dataset that ignores any information about whether the 
specific individual belongs to the protected category, while keeping group 
information about the protected category and satisfying statistical parity.203 
Obfuscation can also be achieved by adding noise to the data sample so that it is 
more difficult to predict protected class membership for each individual from 
the values of the different input variables.204 
A biased machine learning algorithm (independently of whether it has 
reinforced learning) is so because it picked up biases from the training data.205 
Because algorithms are trained by randomly splitting available data into training 
data and testing data, algorithms may appear unbiased when evaluated in the 
testing data simply because the testing data and the training data contain the 
same biases.206 For an antidiscriminatory information policy to be effective, we 
must collect and control information. We need to collect information on race in 
order to see impact on race, but we must also prevent information on race from 
producing discrimination based on race.  
 
 200. APPLE, DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY TECHNICAL OVERVIEW, https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/ 
Differential_Privacy_Overview.pdf (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 201. Zemel et al., supra note 181, at 326. 
 202. Id. (adding that this can be applied to any black box algorithm by applying the encoded classifier to the 
sanitized dataset). 
 203. Id. at 325. 
 204. Feldman et al., supra note 187, at 9–11. 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 130–131. 
 206. Antonio Torralba & Alexei A. Efros, Unbiased Look at Dataset Bias, in 2011 IEEE CONF. ON 
COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 1521, 1524–25 (2012) (proposing the idea of cross dataset 
generalization: a way of seeing if a dataset is biased is to train a model with it and then run the model in a wider 
and more diverse dataset to see if its accuracy drops). 
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IV. DOCTRINAL AND POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
The previous Part demonstrated that we can deploy pre-processing 
techniques to shape or encode the training data, and it also suggested that we 
should do such. This Part explores the doctrinal and policy consequences of 
deploying pre-processing techniques to elaborate on why we should adopt such 
a proposal. This idea is built on the antisubordination theory developed by Fiss, 
Balkin, and Siegel. There are three ways in which an information approach to 
algorithmic discrimination is beneficial for antidiscrimination law: (i) correcting 
for the shortcomings of applying disparate impact protection without engaging 
disparate treatment, (ii) providing the possibility to include contexts in which 
disparate impact statues do not exist or are inapplicable to a certain minority 
group, and (iii) avoiding the problems that algorithmic opacity poses for 
traditional antidiscrimination law. At a policy level, by operating ex-ante, it also 
avoids the social harms created by discriminatory conduct, only partially solved 
by ex-post compensation.207 
A. OVERCOMING THE DISPARATE-IMPACT-DISPARATE-TREATMENT TENSION 
Disparate treatment forbids decision-makers from making distinctions 
based on protected categories, such as choosing not to hire women or black men. 
Disparate impact forbids them from making decisions that impact protected 
categories disproportionately, such as choosing only to hire people above a 
certain height (which adversely affects women) or people who can shave (which 
adversely affects black men). Unlike other jurisdictions where both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact are covered by antidiscrimination law,208 in the 
U.S. disparate impact has a limited scope.209 It is applied only when it is 
explicitly recognized by a statute,210 such as Title VII or the Federal Housing 
Act.211 
 
 207. Austin, supra note 98, at 144. 
 208. Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment Cases in the United States and 
the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. 115, 131 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact 
and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 95, 117–20 (2006). 
These exist under the categories of direct and indirect discrimination (European Union) and direct and adverse 
effect discrimination (Canada). 
 209. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–32 (1971) (holding that Title VII invalidates facially-
neutral requirements with a disparate impact on a protected category even without discriminatory intent unless 
there is a proven relationship between requirements and job performance). 
 210. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2006) (arguing we should move away from the statutory requirements and toward a structural approach to 
antidiscrimination law); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 494, 495 (2003); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested 
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2316 (2006); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory 
a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 732 (2006).  
 211. National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1934); see also Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2014) (ruling that the Federal Housing Acts includes 
disparate impact claims). 
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Like traditional disparate impact doctrine, the algorithmic discrimination 
literature focuses on facially neutral practices that have disproportionately 
adverse effects on protected categories,212 independently of whether there is 
discriminatory intent.213 In algorithmic decision-making, classification schemes 
can be used to exacerbate inequality or disadvantage a protected category, but 
ignoring data about protected categories can also lead to disparate impact.214 
This tension between disparate treatment and disparate impact is not 
exclusive to algorithms. In Ricci v. DeStefano, for example, courts faced the 
question of whether setting aside the results of a test to promote firefighters in 
the New Haven Fire Department to avoid a disparate impact outcome violated 
Title VII. 215 The Supreme Court held that it did.216 So far, however, it has been 
possible for courts to find ad-hoc ways to argue around the tension. In Ricci v. 
DeStefano, the Court did so by arguing that the New Haven Fire Department 
lacked a “strong basis in evidence” to believe that it would have been otherwise 
held liable for disparate impact,217 a workaround that led to criticism.218 
However, with algorithms this tension becomes more evident because ad-hoc 
workarounds turn difficult to implement due to scale. 
This tension has led Barocas to develop the idea of unacknowledged 
affirmative action, arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clean 
line between concepts of algorithmic fairness and affirmative action when there 
is different prevalence among groups.219 This difference can take place due to 
measurement bias. For example, using re-arrests as a proxy for recidivism when 
black individuals get arrested more than white individuals (maintaining amount 
of recidivism stable) will lead to more false positives for black individuals than 
for white individuals. However, it can also take place because of historical 
prejudice. For example, using advanced degrees as a proxy for intelligence when 
 
 212. See generally Kim & Scott, supra note 51 (discussing that while online targeting algorithms might use 
facially neutral variables, they can result in disparate impact as many of the facially neutral categories are proxies 
for categories like gender, age, or race). 
 213. Id. at 25 (“In many ways, discriminatory online targeting fits well with past disparate impact 
cases . . . courts today should find a disparate impact when employers target their recruitment ads using neutral 
attributes that disproportionately exclude users along the lines of race or other protected bases.”). 
 214. Zachary C. Lipton et al., Does Mitigating ML’s Impact Disparity Require Treatment Disparity?, 31 
ADVANCES NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 8136, 8138 (2018), http://papers.nips.cc/paper/8035-does-
mitigating-mls-impact-disparity-require-treatment-disparity.pdf; Hu, supra note 16, at 645; see also Cary 
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 
105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1198 (2017). 
 215. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). In the case, twenty firefighters sued after the city of New Haven invalidated a 
test because nineteen out of the twenty people chosen for a promotion based on the test were white. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 563.  
 218. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. Destefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case and the Triumph of 
White Privilege, 20 S. CALIF. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161 (2011); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: Diluting 
Disparate Impact and Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J. 626 (2012); George Rutherglen, Ricci v. 
DeStefano: Affirmative Action and the Lessons of Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT REV. 83. 
 219. Solon Barocas, What is the Problem to Which Fair Machine Learning is the Solution?, AI NOW 2017 
SYMPOSIUM (2017), https://ainowinstitute.org/symposia/videos/what-is-the-problem-to-which-fair-machine-
learning-is-the-solution.html. 
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low-income individuals have fewer advanced degrees than high-income 
individuals (maintaining intelligence stable) will lead to more false negatives for 
low-income individuals than for high-income individuals.220  
A fairness intervention can correct the algorithm’s measurement bias. 
However, when correcting for a prevalence difference in an output, it is not 
always possible to know how much of it happens because of a measurement bias 
and how much happens because of historical prejudice. Therefore, Barocas 
argues, this would be to engage in affirmative action,221 which is sometimes 
considered prohibited by the anticlassification principle.222 Using information 
on membership of a protected category to treat its members differently could 
give rise to a disparate treatment challenge.223 
Because the law forbids disparate treatment, it is often considered against 
the law to have race as a classifier in the decision; a decision-maker can collect 
information on race, but cannot decide differently based on race. Therefore, we 
cannot use a model that applies different cutoffs to different categories based on 
race to ensure an equal balance of false positives and false negatives. This 
prohibition to use race may harm, therefore, the very group that it is attempting 
to protect.224  
This problem does not apply to the information policy proposed here 
because, while it addresses concerns of disparate impact at the output level, it 
does not treat the groups of individuals differently depending on their 
membership of protected categories. Instead, it applies the same treatment to all 
decision-subjects. This is beneficial because, given that the law may sometimes 
prohibit affirmative action, this method assists in keeping within these legal 
boundaries. 
Disparate treatment is built on the idea of neutrality and non-classification: 
treating men and women differently is not permitted because decision-makers 
must be neutral about gender.225 This information approach does not alter the 
process of the decision. Because it addresses discrimination by dealing with the 
input data not the decision process, it separates the data problem (bias of input 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. In other words, demographic parity as a fairness criterion works without doing affirmative action 
(and thereby decreasing prediction accuracy) only when one assumes that there are no intrinsic differences 
between the groups. Cf. Chander, supra note 39 (proposing a system of algorithmic affirmative action). 
 222. John Lightbourne, Damned Lies and Criminal Sentencing Using Evidence-Based Tools, 15 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 327, 337–342 (arguing this for algorithmic risk assessment, where the Equal Protection clause 
applies); Starr, supra note 39, at 827. 
 223. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 724-28; Kroll et al., supra note 15 at 692–94. Cf. Data Driven 
Discrimination, supra note 21, at 925–932 (arguing instead that Ricci would not apply to this context). 
 224. See generally Muhammad Bilal Zafar et al., Fairness Beyond Disparate Treatment & Disparate 
Impact: Learning Classification Without Disparate Mistreatment, in 2017 INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB 
1171 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1145/3038912.3052660 (developing the concept of disparate mistreatment, 
defined in terms of misclassification rates, to avoid different misclassification rates across groups at a small 
accuracy cost).  
 225. See generally Paul Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1976) (advocating for the continued use of the antidiscrimination principle). 
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data) from the algorithmic problem (measurement bias).226 Therefore, it would 
not fall under the constitutional challenges based on disparate treatment.227 This 
illustrates a benefit of the information approach to discrimination presented here. 
Preventing algorithmic discrimination through an information policy addresses 
disparate impact concerns with a disparate treatment logic. Therefore, it can 
address discrimination in terms of antisubordination in those areas of the law 
where disparate impact is not recognized. 
Information rules are most useful in cases in which disparate impact 
doctrine cannot be applied, leaving groups under-protected by traditional 
antidiscrimination law.228 That is, when there is no statute explicitly 
incorporating disparate impact as Title VII and the Federal Housing Act do. 
Many decisions in daily life, while arguably not as crucial as employment or 
housing, significantly affect people’s quality of life and depend on decision-
makers who might unintentionally discriminate against protected categories.229 
For example, some argue that men tend to mentor more men than women—a 
phenomenon that should raise concern especially because more men than 
women occupy positions of power.230 There is also evidence that doctors tend to 
provide pain medication to white patients more than to black patients.231 Most 
notably, while the the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau considers that 
disparate impact applies to ECOA,232 this may change in the future as there is 
yet no Supreme-Court-recognized disparate impact protection for decisions on 
loan applications, which significantly affect people’s ability to obtain housing. 
Information rules will also be useful when a disparate impact statute 
applies but there are vulnerable groups that are not protected by them. These 
rules can be used, for example, to protect LGBTQ individuals from employment 
 
 226. See, e.g., Johndrow and Lum, supra note 195 (arguing that one should separate the data problem from 
the process problem and develop an algorithm that makes one variable in the input set independent of the 
outcome of the model so that, instead of removing the variable, they propose a method to create outputs that are 
independent of the “protected” variable). 
 227. See Primus, supra note 210, at 494–95 (showing that disparate impact standards such as Title VII are 
not unconstitutional, but tensions exist between these standards and a disparate treatment view of the Equal 
Protection Clause). Current affirmative action cases are good examples of constitutional challenges under a 
disparate treatment theory. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (holding that 
a university’s “race conscious” admission process did not violate equal protection); Students for Fair 
Admissions, v. Harvard College, 261 F. Supp.3d 99 (D. Mass. 2017) (considering whether race was considered 
a “‘plus factor’” in favor of admission to the school). 
 228. Cf. Roberts, supra note 12, at 2123–34 (stating that privacy belongs to the realm of anticlassification 
and antisubordination requires providing more information). 
 229. See generally Colleen Sheppard, Institutional Inequality and the Dynamics of Courage, 31 WINDSOR 
YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 103 (2013) (discussing institutionalized inequality and systemic 
discrimination, and arguing that retroactive legal remedies are ineffective at addressing them). 
 230. See, e.g., KIM ELSESSER, SEX AND THE OFFICE: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE SEX PARTITION THAT’S 
DIVIDING THE WORKPLACE 4 (2015). 
 231. Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False 
Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4296, 4296 
(2016); Sophie Trawalter et al., Racial Bias in Perceptions of Others’ Pain, PLOS ONE, Nov. 2012, at 1 (2012). 
 232. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2012-14 (FAIR LENDING) (2012) 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb_bulletin_lending_discrimination.pdf. 
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discrimination, given that a number courts have held that Title VII protects 
discrimination based on gender but not sexual orientation.233 In the same vein, 
privacy rules can be used for any effort to protect other minorities not considered 
a protected category under Title VII, such as resident legal aliens.234 
In sum, this information approach can expand protection from 
discrimination beyond what standard measures of antidiscrimination can do. 
Moreover, it widens the scope of antidiscrimination protection. Besides doing 
so for those cases in which disparate impact is not recognized,235 it can be used 
when disparate impact is recognized but there are probatory difficulties 
involved.236 These probatory difficulties exist, for example, when disparate 
impact itself is difficult to prove (such as in housing) or when a party raises the 
business necessity defense and its discriminatory intent is difficult to prove. 
B. THE ANTISUBORDINATION PRINCIPLE IN ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION 
Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin have articulated the understanding of 
antidiscrimination as falling under two competing principles: anticlassification 
and antisubordination.237 Anticlassification prohibits classifying based on 
protected categories like gender or race. Antisubordination prohibits 
disadvantaging or aggravating historically vulnerable groups like women or 
Latinos.238 
The logics of anticlassification and antisubordination overlap with the 
distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact in 
antidiscrimination law.239 Disparate impact can be used either as its own 
 
 233. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that forcing the Boy Scouts to 
include a homosexual man violates their First Amendment freedom to express that homosexuality is 
inappropriate); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that sexual identity is 
not covered by Title VII, and emphasizing that that Congress chose not to pass amendments to extend Title VII 
to cover sexual preferences). But see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending 
protection because the claim included unwanted physical conduct, considered by the court to be always of a 
sexual nature and therefore sex discrimination). 
 234. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that Title VII protection on national 
origin does not extend to alienage or citizenship). 
 235. See supra Subpart IV.A.  
 236. See Protecting Privacy, supra note 12, at 2149–55. 
 237. See Bornstein, supra note 62, at 540–43 (applying anticlassification and antisubordination to 
algorithmic discrimination in employment). See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, 
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
 238. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108, 157 (1976). 
 239. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 237, at 12 (“Fiss and the audience of Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause understood the anticlassification and antisubordination principles to have divergent practical implications 
for key issues of the moment: The anticlassification principle impugned affirmative action, while legitimating 
facially neutral practices with racially disparate impact, while the antisubordination principle impugned facially 
neutral practices with a racially disparate impact, while legitimizing affirmative action.”); see also Susan D. 
Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011); Ruth 
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986). But 
see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce 
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standard under the antisubordination principle or as mere evidence for disparate 
treatment under anticlassification. The standard view is that American law 
predominantly follows the anticlassification approach (race or gender blindness) 
with the exception of a few statutes with an antisubordination orientation, such 
as Title VII;240 but other historical accounts have stated that courts have shifted 
ambivalently between both principles. 241  
Applying ex-post antidiscrimination law based on an anticlassification 
approach to algorithms will not avoid their discriminatory outcomes when they 
are based on biases in the sample data or societal biases embedded in 
representative data.242 For example, consider again the Amazon hiring 
algorithm. After realizing that the algorithm discriminated based on gender, 
Amazon modified it to ignore words that denoted gender. However, the 
algorithm continued to “guess” individuals’ gender by using other words in the 
resume that correlated with gender. Courts would not understand this as going 
against the anticlassification principle, but would rather consider it to be a case 
of disparate impact, because classifying based on proxies for protected 
categories is not disparate treatment. If an anticlassification approach were 
applied in a lawsuit against the company, therefore, this bias would remain. 
However, one does not need a notion of antisubordination to modify an 
algorithm’s training data (which, in some way, operates as blindness). Being 
operable under an anticlassification paradigm makes antidiscriminatoty 
information rules compatible with the mainstream of antidiscrimination doctrine 
and case law. This is an advantage because it makes this proposal viable under 
anticlassification-dominated doctrine, even outside of the scope of statutes that 
recognize disparate impact such as Title VII.243  
At the same time pre-processing data in such way is compatible with the 
logic of antisubordination. As Owen Fiss shows, the purpose of the 
antisubordination principle, underlying in disparate impact discrimination, is 
that decisions should not worsen or perpetuate protected groups’ subordinate 
status.244 The purpose of disparate impact-focused antidiscrimination is not to 
 
Hiring Quotas 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1996) (“[F]ar from producing hiring quotas that induce employers 
to discriminate in favor of minorities, disparate impact liability may actually induce hiring discrimination against 
minorities (and other protected groups).”). 
 240. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 
955, 960–67 (2012); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 765 
(1987) (proposing that the liberal interpretation of ERA mistakenly reduced “the problem of the subordination 
of women to men to a problem of gender classification . . . .”). 
 241. See generally Siegel, supra note 237 (detailing how the courts tend to fluctuate between the two 
principles); Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race 
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (tracing a third understanding, in between these two, under which 
equal protection strives not to achieve colorblindness or protection from subordinating practices, but protection 
from the threat of society’s balkanization; courts concerned with antibalkanization focus on diversity more than 
on equality and that some antisubordination-based strategies might generate further divisions in society).  
 242. Corbett-Davies and Goel, supra note 67, at 3. 
 243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012). 
 244. See Fiss, supra note 238, at 157; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2410, 2415–16 (1994). 
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freeze inequality in an unjust situation but rather to correct the state of affairs 
and achieve a more just state of the world.245 This is, as discussed above, what 
training algorithms with fair data would accomplish. 
This builds on the idea discussed earlier that what is needed is not more 
data, but more meaningful data.246 More meaningful data, counterintuitively, 
means a data sample that is unrepresentative of the pool, because it looks like 
what we believe the pool would look like had it not embedded structural 
inequalities. The objection of the endless line of proxies indeed raises an 
important concern. If one cares about disparate impact, protected attributes must 
be included in the data, but they must be included with the objective of training 
the system in a way that avoids disparate impact.247  
To follow an anticlassification approach is to behave like Amazon did after 
discovering the effect of its hiring algorithm: blocking the protected category. If 
disparate impact is applied but merely as evidence for disparate treatment, 
blocking the protected category (in this case, gender) is sufficient to avoid 
disparate treatment because blindness guarantees a lack of differential treatment 
among groups.248 But, because of the endless line of proxies described above, 249 
blindness will not avoid disparate impact outcomes. To avoid such outcomes, 
one must do something different than either blocking or allowing information 
about protected categories. To apply the antisubordination principle to 
algorithmic discrimination is to lie to the machine. It is to represent to the 
machine the world that we want as opposed to replicating the world that we have.  
C. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS IMPOSSIBILITY 
Discrimination discovery through concepts of algorithmic fairness, like 
disparate impact discrimination, are standards that the algorithmic decision must 
satisfy ex-post.250 The focus of this Article is not to elucidate such standards, but 
to explore how they can be achieved ex-ante. 
 
 245. See Fiss, supra note 238, at 176 (distinguishing between equal treatment and equal status); see also 
Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. 
L. REV. 67, 69 (2017). 
 246. See Barocas and Selbst, supra note 105 (arguing that what is needed is not more data, but meaningful 
data); see also supra Subarts II.B and II.C. 
 247. Cynthia Dwork et al., Decoupled Classifiers for Group-Fair and Efficient Machine Learning, in CONF. 
ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 119, 120 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/ 
dwork18a.html (providing an example of disparate learning process and suggesting training each group 
separately). 
 248. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 237,at 9–11; Colker, supra note 239, at 1005–06. 
 249. See supra Subpart II.D. 
 250. See generally Žliobaitė, supra note 45, at 5 (“Discrimination prevention develops machine learning 
algorithms that would produce predictive models, ensuring that those models are free from discrimination, while, 
standard predictive models, induced by machine learning and data mining algorithms, may discriminate groups 
of people due to training data being biased, incomplete, or recording past discriminatory decisions.”). 
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Recall the COMPAS recidivism algorithm and the Amazon employment 
algorithm. The problem with these algorithms is not that they are biased, but 
rather that they reinforce the world that we have.251  
To determine whether such processes are discriminatory, computer 
scientists apply mathematical notions of fairness.252 While there are many such 
notions, they can broadly be categorized into group fairness criteria and 
individual fairness criteria.253 Individual criteria are based on predicted criterion 
scores for each individual, such as an equal rate of false positives and false 
negatives for individuals in each group. 254 Group criteria are based on the 
distribution of criterion scores between the population groups, such as the 
protected category having an equal proportion of positive classification than the 
overall population.255 
The problem with “fixing” these algorithms is that one cannot have 
calibration between groups (group fairness) at the same time that one controls 
for individual classification (individual fairness).256 In other words, calibration 
and equal false positives and false negative rates for individuals cannot be 
satisfied at the same time.257 Making a test that has both (i) the same number of 
false positives and false negatives for individuals across populations and (ii) the 
same level of accuracy among populations is only possible when the populations 
are identical for the purposes of the analysis.258  
We can see this dichotomy in the tension between two concepts of 
algorithmic fairness: predictive accuracy and statistical parity. Predictive 
accuracy measures one group of individuals against another: the error rates in 
classification (false positives and false negatives) should be the same for both 
groups.259 Statistical parity measures positive predictions against all predictions, 
and poses that the rate of positive predictions should be the same across groups: 
 
 251. This is the decision-making problem in which the algorithm perpetuates and amplifies societal biases. 
See supra Subpart II.D. 
 252. See generally Ben Hutchinson & Margaret Mitchell, 50 Years of Test (Un)fairness: Lessons for 
Machine Learning, in 2019 CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.10104.pdf. 
 253. See Zemel et al., supra note 181, at 325. 
 254. See, e.g., Chouldechova, supra note 38, at 133. See generally Hardt et al., supra note 167. 
 255. Dwork et al., supra note 145, at 18 (proposing an individual fairness framework based on a task-specific 
and externally defined similarity metrics between individuals, under the principle that “similar people [should 
be] treated similarly”). See generally Sorelle A. Friedler et al., On the (Im)possibility of Fairness, (Sept. 23, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.07236.pdf; Zemel et al., supra note 181. 
 256. Jon Kleinberg, Inherent Trade-Offs in Algorithmic Fairness, in ABSTRACTS OF THE 2018 ACM 
INT'LCONF. ON MEASUREMENT AND MODELING OF COMPUTER SYS. 40, 43–44 (2018), 
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3219617.3219634.  
 257. Calibration requires that the expected proportion of individuals for each group that receives a positive 
(or negative) outcome are equivalent. Id. 
 258. See FRY, supra note 2, at 66–69 (explaining the intuition behind this and providing a numerical 
example). 
 259. Chouldechova, supra note 38, at 157 (“[I]f an instrument satisfies predictive parity . . . but the 
prevalence differs between groups, the instrument cannot achieve equal [false positives] and [false negatives] 
across those groups.”); see also Corbett-Davies, supra note 151; Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 177; Hardt et 
al., supra note 167, at 19. 
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both groups should have equal fractions labeled as positive.260 While predictive 
accuracy is an individual fairness criterion, statistical parity is a group fairness 
criterion,261 and one cannot achieve individual notions of fairness and group 
notions of fairness at the same time.262 The first criterion requires the algorithm 
to be as likely to be wrong about whether I will recidivate, or be a good 
employee, as it will with someone from the other group.263 The second criterion 
requires the algorithm to predict that an equal proportion of both groups (e.g. of 
white and black individuals) will recidivate, or be good employees.264 However, 
if the two populations in fact have different recidivism rates, or different 
employee satisfaction scores, then the algorithm cannot simultaneously be 
consistently accurate with all individuals and predict equal levels of success for 
both groups.  
In the COMPAS example, this means that for Northpointe to develop an 
algorithm with equal predictive power for white defendants and black 
defendants given the data that Northpointe had, the algorithm would necessarily 
have different rates of false positives and false negatives for both types of 
defendants.265 This holds even without collecting information about race.266 
The broader issue, in other words, is that some notions of algorithmic 
fairness are incompatible with others.267 This means that a normative choice is 
 
 260. See Feldman et al., supra note 186, at 261–63 (explaining statistical parity); see also Calders & Verwer, 
supra note 181, at 285-290; Kamishima et al., supra note 142, at 643. 
 261. MacCarthy, supra note 245, at 102; see also Chouldechova, supra note 38, at 157 (“[I]f an instrument 
satisfies predictive parity . . . but the prevalence differs between groups, the instrument cannot achieve equal 
[false positives] and [false negatives] across those groups.”); Hutchinson & Mitchell, supra note 252 (explaining 
how most modern machine learning notions of fairness map to mathematical notions of fairness of the 1970s 
and 1980s in the fields of education and employment). 
 262. Friedler et al., supra note 255; see also Richard L. Sawyer, Nancy S. Cole & James W. L. Cole, Utilities 
and the Issue of Fairness in a Decision Theoretic Model for Selection, 13 J. EDUC. MEAS. 59, 69 (1976) 
(“[M]aximization procedures based on individual parity do not produce equal opportunity (equal selection for 
equal success) based on group parity and the opportunity procedures do not produce success maximization (equal 
treatment for equal prediction) based on individual parity.”). 
 263. Zemel et al., supra note 181, at 325 (defining individual fairness as “similar individuals should be 
treated similarly” [independent of membership to a protected category]); see also Dwork et al., supra note 145, 
at 2 (proposing such definition). 
 264. Zemel et al., supra note 181, at 325 (defining group fairness as “the proportion of members in a 
protected group receiving positive classification is identical to the proportion in the population as a whole”). See 
generally MacCarthy, supra note 246 (defending the use of group fairness in algorithmic design). 
 265. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS (2010) (exploring 
racial bias in crime data). Northpointe repeatedly claimed, in fact, that its scores were well calibrated, as 
unconvincing as one could find this claim. See Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret 
Altorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-
software-programs-secret-algorithms.html. 
 266. See Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 177 (analyzing COMPAS in terms of predictive accuracy and 
statistical parity). 
 267. Friedler et al., supra note 255 (showing the tension between individual and group notions of fairness). 
See generally Sawyer et al., supra note 262. The problem of applying a machine learning algorithm to a different 
context, which may require a different definition of fairness, has been called the portability trap. Andrew D. 
Selbst et al., Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems, in 2019 CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY 
& TRANSPARENCY 59, 61 (2019), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3287560.3287598. 
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necessary. One can either define fairness in an individual way (in terms of false 
positives and false negatives) or one can define fairness in terms of equal 
predictive accuracy across groups.268 This takes place because, like any other 
risk estimates, fairness criteria will be incompatible when base rates among 
groups are not the same.269 We simply cannot have both at the same time with 
non-identical groups.270 That is, unless we alter the data about them. 
While a sizeable amount of research on algorithmic fairness focuses on the 
relationship between concepts of fairness and tradeoffs between fairness and 
accuracy,271 recent research has also pointed out that, when unfairness is 
introduced by small sample sizes or unmeasured predictive variables, it may be 
more effective to address the problem at the data collection stage.272 Similarly, 
several industry members with research divisions that focus on algorithmic bias, 
such as IBM and Microsoft, have emphasized the issue that machine learning 
algorithms are only as good as the data that we feed them.273 
While this research focuses on collecting more data, which the legal 
literature has already problematized,274 we can take their considerations to argue 
instead for different data. 
D. AVOIDING ALGORITHMIC OPACITY 
One of the central issues with algorithmic decision-making is its opacity 
problem. A spam filter, for example, uses classifiers and predictors to determine 
whether an email is likely spam, but it cannot explain why it is such. Credit card 
fraud detection algorithms follow the same dynamic, as do credit scoring and 
loan decision algorithms.275 In addition, the most accurate methods of machine 
 
 268. See, e.g., Corbett-Davies, supra note 151. 
 269. Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, in 2017 PROC. IN 
INNOVATIONS & THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. 1, 17 (2017). 
 270. Geoff Pleiss et al., On Fairness and Calibration, in 2017 CONF. ON NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 1, 
8 (2017), http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7151-on-fairness-and-calibration.pdf; see also Žliobaitė, supra note 45, at 
3 (“Quite often research papers propose a new way to quantify discrimination, and a new algorithm that would 
optimize that measure. The variety of approaches to evaluation makes it difficult to compare the results and 
assess the progress in the discipline, and even more importantly, it makes it difficult to recommend 
computational strategies for practitioners and policy makers.”). 
 271. Feldman et al., supra note 181, at 3–4; Indre Žliobaitė, On the Relation Between Accuracy and Fairness 
in Binary Classification, in 2015 WORKSHOP ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY IN MACHINE 
LEARNING (2015), http://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05723. 
 272. Irene Chen et al., Why Is My Classifier Discriminatory?, in 2018 CONF. ON NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING 
SYS. (2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.12002 . 
 273. See Ruchir Puri, Mitigating Bias in AI Models, IBM RES. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2018/02/mitigating-bias-ai-models; John Roach, Microsoft Improves 
Facial Recognition to Perform Well Across All Skin Tones, Genders, MICROSOFT: AI BLOG (June 26, 2018), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/ai/gender-skin-tone-facial-recognition-improvement/. 
 274. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21. 
 275. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1249, 1286–87, 1289 
(2008). See generally PASQUALE, supra note 1; Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding 
Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan. 6, 2016 at 1. 
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learning, and thus the ones for which there is greater incentive to adopt, seem to 
be the least explainable ones.276  
Opacity introduces a regulatory problem not only because decision-
subjects may have a right to an explanation,277 but also because it makes it more 
difficult to create an environment that reduces the existence of biases, 278 and it 
limits the application of doctrines such as disparate impact. 279 It is difficult, in 
other words, to correct a decision-making process that we cannot access or 
understand.280 While this Article is not concerned with explainability and 
procedural rights, opacity is relevant for the consequences of algorithmic 
decisions because evaluating such consequences becomes difficult where the 
algorithm is opaque.281 
One should be note that opacity, or inscrutability, is not unique to 
automated decision-making—humans can be black boxes, too. Many human 
decisions seem inscrutable and opaque.282 One reason for which opacity is still 
relevant in algorithmic decision-making is that the law is used to treating humans 
as a black box, but it does not always do so with algorithms.283 Another reason 
for which opacity and inscrutability are relevant is because humans can choose 
to deploy algorithms in environments, such as hiring, where their opacity may 
be strategically advantageous to human decision-makers who could have chosen 
a different system because it adds an additional layer of obfuscation to access 
 
 276. Solon Barocas, Understanding Inscrutability, ALGORITHMS EXPLAN. CONF. PAP. (2018). 
 277. Opacity refers to the lack of understanding of how a decision-making algorithm arrives at its outputs 
from its inputs. Burrell, supra note 275, at 2. 
 278. Miriam C. Buiten, Towards Intelligent Regulation of Artificial Intelligence, 10 EUROPEAN J. OF RISK 
REG. 41, 43 (2019). 
 279. See Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21; see also Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra 
note 21, at 12 (“Another challenge is that the factors driving the results may be unknown. An algorithm can be 
so complex that its decision process is completely opaque—even to the programmers who created it. . . . Given 
these characteristics, biased algorithms raise many questions and challenges for disparate impact doctrine. If an 
algorithm produces a racially discriminatory effect, can the employer meet its burden of showing that it is ‘job 
related’ by demonstrating that it rests on a robust statistical correlation? Even if the correlation is unexplained?”). 
 280. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 35, at 18–20 (arguing that procedural regularity is essential for those 
stigmatized by AI scoring systems, and the U.S. tradition of due process should inform basic safeguards; the law 
should open algorithmic black boxes and allow people to examine them). See generally Citron, supra note 275 
(highlighting accountability deficits and arguing that a new concept of technological due process essential to 
uphold procedural protections). 
 281. See Cynthia Rudin et al., The Age of Secrecy and Unfairness in Recidivism Prediction (Nov. 2 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00731 (reverse engineering the COMPAS algorithm and 
using it as an example of how lack of transparency leads to uncertainty as to whether an algorithm meets any 
standard of fairness); Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra note 21, at 13 (“Existing disparate impact 
doctrine isn’t equipped to deal with issues like these, and so to address classification bias, the law needs to 
recognize that predictive algorithms differ from traditional ability tests and to adapt accordingly.”). 
 282. We humans are able to produce the equivalent of algorithmic post-hoc explainability through verbal 
accounts of a decision process. This can be done in deep learning algorithms, for example, through saliency 
maps. But requiring post-hoc explainability despite a black box nature and requiring interpretability (or 
intelligibility) are different demands. See Lipton, supra note 53; see also Kroll et al., supra note 15, at 657-59 
(arguing against the idea that transparency is a panacea). 
 283. Katherine Strandburg, Algorithmic Explainability (2019) (on file with author); Cofone & Strandburg, 
supra note 130. 
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people’s true motivations.284 A third reason for which this is relevant is that, 
while human opacity is inevitable—and the best thing we can do is demand 
good-faith explanations—algorithmic opacity is not.285 In terms of regulating 
information, algorithms that may discriminate place regulators in a better 
position than they were before, as they provide an opportunity to regulate the 
data in ways that one cannot do for human decision-makers. 
Opacity is particularly problematic when it obfuscates intent. 
Discriminatory intent, while required to establish disparate treatment 
discrimination,286 is often difficult to prove in the context of algorithmic 
decision-making.287  
By focusing on the acquisition of suspected information rather than on its 
use, and by depriving decision-makers of these information points, 
antidiscriminatory information rules avoid the need for proving what is in the 
mind of the employer.288 This proof is difficult to obtain as employers have 
incentives to hide discriminatory intent and can do so especially when they have 
mixed motives.289Information rules, in other words, are effective at dealing with 
facially neutral screening rules set with ulterior motives.290 
Opacity has been classified in three types.291 The first is intentional opacity, 
when the process is deliberately hidden, as in trade secrets. For example, 
COMPAS, described above, does not ask for race as an input. However, some 
of its data points, which have different weights, correlate to race. It is difficult 
to know exactly how this took place because the algorithm is a trade secret, so 
its code is unavailable to the public and to those who are granted or refused 
parole based on it.292 The second is opacity as result of some inevitable degree 
 
 284. Nicholas Diakopoulos, Accountability in Algorithmic Decision Making, 59 COMMC’NS OF THE ASS’N. 
OF COMPUTING MACHINERY 56, 59–61 (2016). 
 285. Depending on the algorithm, it can be harder to reverse-engineer human decisions than it is fto reverse-
engineer algorithmic decisions. I explore different types of algorithms in terms of their opacity in Part IV. 
 286. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976) (holding a showing of discriminatory intent 
may violate Equal Protection Clause). 
 287. Kim & Scott, supra note 51, at 24 (“Disparate treatment cases turn on employer intent, and thus, 
whether an employer’s online targeting strategy supports a finding of liability depends upon how clearly it 
indicates a discriminatory preference. If the employer expressly excludes some social media users from its target 
audience because of their protected characteristics, those choices strongly suggest that it intends to discourage 
members of those groups from applying. For example, if an employer directs its advertising only at men, or only 
at persons aged 18 to 35, a court may infer that a female or older applicant was rejected because of the employer’s 
discriminatory motive. Less explicit strategies, such as selecting an audience using neutral attributes or relying 
on the lookalike audience tool, may not clearly indicate a discriminatory preference, making it more difficult to 
infer motive from these choices.”).  
 288. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).  
 289. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141-
42 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Desert Palace 
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003) (holding that overt discrimination is not always required in mixed motive 
cases). 
 290. Cofone, supra note 11, at 162–64. 
 291. Burrell, supra note 275, at 1–2. 
 292. See Cofone & Strandburg, supra note 130 (exploring when subjects of algorithms can and should be 
told how the decision process works while avoiding gaming concerns). 
G - COFONE_16 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:31 PM 
August 2019] ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION 1439 
of the general public’s technical illiteracy: it would be too costly to teach 
complex processes to all the population. The third is opacity as a result of the 
characteristics and scale of an algorithm, such as deep learning algorithms, for 
which a certain degree of opacity is inherent to the learning process.293  
The three kinds of opacity require different kinds of responses if the 
outcome of the algorithm being used is deemed discriminatory. For the first, 
disclosure of the decision-making process can be mandated, especially to 
determine whether antidiscrimination law is being disregarded.294 For the 
second, general education to understand the process can be put in place or expert 
auditing can be implemented (leading to the question of for whom should the 
algorithm be made transparent).295  
For the third, opacity that is inherent to a decision-making algorithm, 
determining the type of response required is more difficult. Deep learning 
algorithms, for example, lead to the third type of opacity because, with them, we 
simply have raw data in the world and a black box that processes such data, 296 
so it is difficult to know how discriminatory outcomes are reached. However, 
because as discussed above, humans are a black box too, the law has experience 
in addressing that. For deep learning algorithms, then, we may draw upon the 
principles that we have for humans. Counterintuitively, the most advanced 
technology is the technology that may turn out to be least disruptive for the 
law.297 
Opacity generates another related problem for algorithmic bias. Opacity 
makes liability difficult to determine: harmed parties need some level of 
transparency in order to substantiate their claims.298 Transparency in terms of 
interpretability is imporant for plantiffs because it is key for determining 
whether the model complied with technical and legal standards. But definitions 
 
 293. Burrell, supra note 275, at 1–2. 
 294. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal 
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (arguing that algorithms under trade secret laws should disclose 
their decision-making process when being used in criminal procedure); Rebecca Wexler, Opinion, When a 
Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/ 
opinion/how-computers-are-harming-criminal-justice.html. 
 295. See Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, supra note 21, at 13 (arguing that, despite its limitations, 
auditing for discrimination should remain an important part of the strategy to detect and respond to bias in 
algorithms); Roth, supra note 107, at 1984–85 (questioning the role of algorithms in trials and arguing that, in 
evidence law, more than accuracy, our worry should be whether the jury has enough tools to interpret the 
algorithm). 
 296. See Leilani H. Gilpin et al., Explaining Explanations: An Overview of Interpretability of Machine 
Learning, in 2018 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON DATA SCIENCE & ADVANCED ANALYTICS (2018), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/1806.00069.pdf (“[T]he fundamental problem facing explanations of such processing is to find ways to 
reduce the complexity of all these operations . . . . One common viewpoint in the deep neural network community 
is that the level of interpretability and theoretical understanding needed to for transparent explanations of large 
DNNs remains out of reach.”); see also supra Subpart IV.A. 
 297. Cofone, supra note 11(arguing that end technologies are sometimes the least disruptive because they 
can be analogized to humans, and transition technologies are sometimes the most disruptive because they don’t 
share features that the law picks up neither with humans nor with objects). 
 298. Buiten, supra note 278, at 57 (adding that this obstacle may also create difficulties in the protection of 
fundamental rights); see also Rudin et al., supra note 281, at 2–3. 
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of transparency are diverse, they present tradeoffs with each other, and they are 
not always achievable.299  
Antidiscriminatory information rules have the advantage that, because they 
focus on regulating the data rather than on regulating the algorithm, they 
function on opaque models as well as on interpretable ones. While a black box 
algorithm can contain discrimination that is invisible, making it impossible to 
identify and mitigate the causes of its discriminatory outcome, it is possible to 
shape and encode the training data of a black box algorithm.  
Thus, the antidiscriminatory information rules explored here are 
particularly relevant when ex-post regulation or liability are faced with obstacles 
related to algorithmic opacity. Because of opacity, applying traditional, ex-post 
antidiscrimination law is significantly more difficult for black box algorithms 
than it is for humans; however, because one can regulate their input data, 
applying an information policy is actually easier for black box algorithms than 
it is for human decision-makers. 
E. THE VALUE AND COST OF EX-ANTE REGULATION 
Implementing a preventive approach that addresses discrimination through 
information is particularly valuable in the context of algorithms. This is not only 
because of the disparate-impact disparate-treatment tension, which leads 
antidiscrimination law to be ineffective at dealing with algorithms,300 and the 
insufficient coverage of disparate impact in American law. It is also valuable for 
alogorithms from a policy perspective because, for victims of discrimination, 
preventing discriminatory harm is more valuable than repairing it. 
At a policy level, by operating ex-ante, this approach avoids the social 
harms created by discriminatory conduct, which are only partially solved by ex-
post compensation.301 The harm produced by discrimination is only partly 
monetary, and even to the extent that it is monetary it is extremely difficult to 
compensate fully.302 While antidiscrimination litigation is of crucial importance 
to providing redress to those who have suffered discriminatory harm and to 
discourage discrimination ex ante, developing preventive measures that aim to 
eradicate discrimination more directly is of crucial importance.303 This is 
particularly the case for addressing systemic discrimination, which is difficult to 
compensate and detect.304 
 
 299. Lipton, supra note 53, at 98–99. 
 300. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21, at 694–712. 
 301. See Austin, supra note 98, at 41–55 (presenting a discussion of privacy acting as a preventive or 
anticipatory remedy).  
 302. See Protecting Privacy, supra note 12, at 2155–56. 
 303. See MARIE MERCAT-BRUNS, DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: COMPARING EUROPEAN, FRENCH, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 108 (2016) (“Although litigation is important for bringing to light purportedly objective 
requirements perpetuating workforce segregation, prevention is key to eliminating systemic discrimination.”).  
 304. See generally Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 21 (explaining that the consequences of 
algorithmic discrimination take place on a large scale rather than an individual scale); Sheppard, supra note 229 
(discussing the challenges of systemic discrimination for antidiscrimination law). 
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This regulation of information, however, comes at a cost. This type of 
regulation would often imply a loss in accuracy with respect to the output 
variable. If, continuing with the examples used, “re-arrest” is taken as an output 
variable to gauge recidivism or “current employees” is taken as an output 
variable to gauge good job candidates, altering the input data in such a way will 
reduce the accuracy of the model to predict the output variable, even if it may or 
may not do so for what the model is actually supposed to predict. 305 In other 
words, these algorithms would have lower predictive accuracy with regards to 
their human-determined proxy—similarity with current employees and 
likelihood of re-arrest—but not necessarily with regards to the target variable.  
If one believes that the Amazon algorithm and COMPAS were biased with 
respect to the target variable (desirableness as an employee or likelihood to 
recidivate), this should lead one to believe that, when trained with fair data, they 
would not have lower predictive accuracy with respect to the desired 
prediction.306 The adjustment would correct for the error between the chosen 
proxy and the target variable: between similarity with current employees and 
likelihood of re-arrest and desirableness as an employee and likelihood of re-
offense.  
But imagine one held the (arguably questionable) belief that the algorithms 
were not disadvantaging a protected category by hiring fewer women and 
imprisoning more black individuals, and therefore that training them with fair 
data would lead to lower predictive accuracy with respect to the target variable. 
Whether one considers the algorithms as they exist as discriminatory would 
depend on whether there are duties of reasonable accommodation, which hinge 
upon the antidiscrimination principle used.307 For example, courts have ruled in 
the past that no-beards policies disproportionately affect black men and therefore 
constitute disparate impact discrimination, even if this implies a minor economic 
loss and therefore some duty of accommodation for the employer.308 
Under certain circumstances, the law will consider a decision as 
discriminatory even if the prediction is true because what is required under 
disparate impact is for the employer, or court, to adjust its expectation or provide 
options for the person to perform the task.309 Because algorithmic discrimination 
is mainly a disparate impact problem,310 when disparate impact is identified one 
 
 305. But see Feldman et al., supra note 181 (developing a method to remove information on protected 
category  without reducing accuracy by preserving each individual’s rank orthogonal to their class membership 
and showing that, while removing gender in a database fails at preventing discrimination, a number of pre-
processing techniques eliminates discrimination with a minimal loss in accuracy). 
 306. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 17, at 704 (noting that overfitting generates less accurate predictions for 
minority groups). 
 307. See supra Subparts IV.A., IV.B. 
 308. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993); Richardson v. Quik Trip 
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1155-56 (S.D. Iowa 1984); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 
1981). But see Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1980); Lewis 
v. Univ. of Pa, No. 16 Civ. 5874, slip. op. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2018). 
 309. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 697–99 (2001). 
 310. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 21. 
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should expect the law to introduce some cost, such as reduced overall accuracy, 
in a similar way that disparate impact antidiscrimination law does for human 
decisions.311 While the cost of poor classification is currently borne by minorties 
and other vulnerable groups, shifting this cost to decision-makers would provide 
incentives to invest in improving classification accuracy.312 One could therefore 
establish that, when there is a discriminatory outcome, the creator of a decision-
making algorithm has a burden of proof on adequacy of data. 
The fact that a regulation brings some level of costs does not necessarily 
make it undesirable. Regulating the discriminatory outcomes of algorithms is 
likely to be welfare-increasing by reducing negative externalities to the 
populations being discriminated against and overcoming collective action 
problems. And, like other aspects of antidiscrimination law, it would also have 
desirable distributive purposes.313 
This, of course, would not eradicate underlying biases or replace existing 
proposals of legal reform that address wider problems. Computers will not fix 
our societal biases, but we can stop them from perpetuating and amplifying 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
Algorithmic discrimination continues to puzzle scholars of law and 
technology. But humans still make the most relevant decisions in algorithmic 
decision-making processes. Because algorithmic discrimination relies on human 
decisions, algorithmic and human discrimination work similarly in terms of 
information availability: depending on the information involved, giving the 
decision-maker less information can either prevent or worsen both algorithmic 
and human discrimination. 
This Article introduces a preventive approach to algorithmic 
discrimination. For machine learning algorithms, blocking information can hide 
and sometimes worsen discrimination. However, while blocking data on 
protected categories is unhelpful, shaping the information that includes 
protected categories can be effective at eliminating bias from the data that 
decision-making models are trained with and, in turn, eliminating discrimination 
from such models. We can edit training data to resemble the more equal world 
that the law dictates we should live in. 
To some extent, the literature on algorithmic discrimination has so far 
explored legal solutions to an information problem. The method proposed here 
brings a complementary information-based solution to the information problem. 
In addition to repairing discrimination after it takes place as traditional 
antidiscrimination law does, this information-based approach can prevent some 
instantiations of discrimination. 
 
 311. See generally Jolls, supra note 309. 
 312. Hardt et al., supra note 167. 
 313. See John Gardner, Discrimination as Injustice, 16 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 353, 355-56 (1996); John 
Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination, 9 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 1, 11 (1989). 
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This approach is compatible with, and can be implemented alongside the 
existing, compensation-based legal solutions. It can prevent disparate impact 
under a disparate treatment logic, avoiding constitutional challenges; it is a 
corollary of taking the antisubordination principle seriously in the context of 
algorithmic discrimination; it can be applied to black box models when other 
methods cannot; and it has the advantage of preventing discrimination rather 
than reparing it.  
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